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Nearly 20 employees are killed and 20,000 injured in the United States each day, with a 
contributing cause in nearly all being unsafe behavior.  Unsafe behaviors are the result of 
a negative organizational safety culture, which includes the attitudes and beliefs toward 
safety transmitted from executives and front-line leaders to shop floor employees.  While 
previous research indicated that front-line leaders have great impact on employee’s 
perception of safety culture, how executives impact the development of safety culture 
was less understood.  The theory of planned behavior and social exchange theory were 
used in this descriptive phenomenological research study to address the research question 
associated with the lived experience of safety professionals observing the development of 
safety culture in their organization, as impacted by the interventions of executives.  
Participants were purposefully selected based on criteria for professional experience, time 
with their current organization, and their affiliation with professional safety 
organizations.  Semistructured interviews were conducted, transcripts created, and hand-
coding was employed to identify trends in responses.  Emergent themes identified the 
most impactful methods employed by executives to drive the development of a positive 
safety culture; engagement, trust, ownership, and integration.  The social change that this 
research can drive is an improvement in safety culture, leading to an increase in safe 
behaviors and a reduction in occupational deaths and injuries.  The practical application 
of this study to the safety profession is to help guide executives on the most appropriate 
actions to take to improve safety culture and injury reduction in their organization 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of 
occupational injury.  Approximately 88% of occupational injuries are associated with 
unsafe behaviors which are a result of the safety culture that has developed within the 
organization through the interactions, messages and expectations of the organization.  It 
has long been identified that management plays a role in the development of safety 
culture.  The most consistent demonstration of safety culture comes from the relationship 
with an employee’s direct manager (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989).  However, 
organizations struggle with ensuring that the safety culture of the executive leadership 
team is conveyed to shop for employees through their front-line supervisor (Antonsen, 
2009).  This is vital, as senior managers set the tone for safety culture within their 
organizations (Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson, & Denyer, 2016). Research into the 
interventions employed by management to improve safety culture is necessary 
(Bronkhorst, Tummers, & Steijn, 2018). 
I investigated the interventions employed by executive leaders in organizations, as 
perceived by safety professionals supporting the organization, in order to identify 
effective interventions for developing a positive organizational safety culture.  Through 
this research, I identified effective interventions that can be employed by executives in 
order to build a positive safety culture for their organization, reduce unsafe behaviors and 




This chapter will include a brief summary of existing literature on the topic, the 
gap that my proposed study addressed, the research problem, the purpose of the study, 
research questions.  The chapter will also include the theoretical framework for the study, 
the rationale for the design of the study and the methodology to be employed, definitions, 
assumptions, the scope of the study, transferability, limitations, professional application 
of the research and the positive social change that it may drive. 
Background of the Study 
Historical research and current research continue to reinforce that a contributing 
cause in nearly all occupational injuries is unsafe behavior (Goh, Ubeynarayana, Wong, 
& Guo, 2018).  In many cases, this unsafe behavior is noncompliance with safety 
procedures (Dahl & Olsen, 2013).  Employee safety behavior is influenced by an 
organization's safety culture, which is based on the organization's values and beliefs 
regarding safety (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007) and exhibited in the behaviors of 
employees (Brettel, Chomik, & Flatten, 2015).  If safety is perceived as a value by 
management and upheld, employees will reduce unsafe behaviors and perform work with 
safety in mind, reducing injuries (Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005).   
The relationship between the front-line employee and their direct supervisor 
drives employee behaviors (Kapp, 2012).  Supervisors who place greater value on safety 
experience greater compliance, while those who place lower value on safety experience 
lower levels of compliance (Kapp, 2012).  Pilbeam et al. (2016) found that the 
relationship between the front-line supervisor and his/her direct reports has been studied, 
while other leadership relationships, such as senior managers, that set the tone for safety 
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culture within their organizations, need to be investigated.  Where studies on senior 
managers and their commitment to safety culture have been conducted, limitations still 
exist.  Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, and Kirwan (2014) conducted a study after previous 
research indicated that senior leaders had significant influence on safety culture but did 
not explain which characteristics of the senior leader had the greatest effect.  Fruhen et al. 
(2014) indicated characteristics of senior leaders that were key to influencing safety 
among air traffic management companies.  Transferability was limited in this study 
because the study indicated attributes, not specific actions that were most beneficial at 
improving safety culture.  Biggs, Banks, Davey, and Freeman (2013) found that 
leadership and visibility of senior leaders was the primary, effective means to 
implementing a positive safety culture in the Australian construction industry.  This study 
showed the need for additional research to determine if the findings were applicable 
outside of Australia and outside of the construction industry. 
In addition to addressing the issues of transferability and generalizability 
associated with previous studies, future research is needed to address limitations or 
recommendations from previous research.  One such application of a recommendation 
includes the review of the attitude and commitment of the senior leader as observed by 
their organization’s safety professional.  This is in alignment with Fruhen et al. (2014), 
who suggested researching the perception of safety culture through the views of other 
employees in the organizational hierarchy.  Bronkhorst et al. (2018) indicated significant 
improvement in the perception of senior management priority of safety after conducting 
walk arounds on the shop floor.  However, the study was unable to identify which 
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intervention at which hierarchical level had the greatest effect on safety culture 
improvement.  "Future studies could try to develop intervention studies using various 
treatment arms to disentangle individual effects and fruitful combinations." (Bronkhorst 
et al., 2018, p.28).   
Recommendations for future research also originated from the Gravina, 
Cummins, and Austin (2017) study and the Engemann and Scott (2018) study.  These 
studies showed that senior leaders have been found to use dynamic or on the fly 
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raise concerns about leaders’ 
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety 
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).  Bronkhorst et al. 
(2018) also identified a limitation of the study that there was no qualitative data collected 
on the interventions to understand the why and the how of the effectiveness of the 
intervention, which was addressed in this research. 
In this study, I addressed the recommendations of Engemann and Scott (2018), 
Bronkhorst et al. (2018), Gravina et al. (2017) and Fruhen et al. (2014) as well as address 
the generalizability issues associated with the Fruhen et al. (2014) and the Biggs et al. 
(2013) studies.  I examined which characteristics, at the senior manager organizational 
levels, have been observed by the organization’s safety professional as having the 
greatest impact on the development of safety culture.  The research is necessary to 
address recommendations and limitations in previous studies in order to improve 
employee safety behaviors through the development of a positive safety culture, reducing 




 Each year United States occupational accidents result in the death of more than 
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly 5 million more (Hofmann, Burke, & 
Zohar, 2017).  These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the 
economy as nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (Marucci-
Wellman et al., 2015).  The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88% of 
occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and 
beliefs toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive 
safety culture (Zhang et al., 2018).  Conversely, if safety is perceived as a value by 
management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind, reducing 
injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005).   
 The specific management problem is that when executives use dynamic or on the 
fly leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), concerns are raised about leaders’ 
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety 
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).  Bronkhorst et al. 
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to 
improve safety culture. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was 
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their 
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice, 
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may allow for improved development of training.  The training could encourage 
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces 
occupational death and injury.  I asked safety professionals to describe the interventions 
that have been employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the 
effectiveness of such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization.  
My intent was to capture the lived experience of the safety professionals, as identified by 
Giorgi (2009). 
Research Questions 
 The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe 
the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their 
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  The central research question (RQ) 
was: 
 RQ:  What are the lived experiences of safety professionals observing the 
development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the interventions of 
executives?    
Theoretical Foundation 
 I situated this study between the gaps identified by Pilbeam et al. (2016) and 
Fruhen et al. (2013) by describing the lived experience of the safety professional as safety 
culture develops through executive interventions within the organization.  I analyzed the 
artifacts of culture through the lived experiences of organizational insiders, to make 
deciphering the artifacts possible, as explained by Schein (1990).   
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 The framework for this study draws upon the theory of planned behavior and 
social exchange theory.  Ajzen (1991), using his theory of planned behavior, suggested 
that employee behavior is based on the norms accepted by significant individuals in the 
organization, which includes managers.  Montano and Kasprzyk (2015) proposed the use 
of the theory of planned behavior in conjunction with the theory of planned action in 
order to consider accepted norms as well as attitudes, behaviors and feelings of control.  
These theories are applicable to safety culture as employee safety attitude and behavior 
have been found to be influenced by an organization's safety culture, which is based on 
the employee beliefs and attitude toward safety (Choudhry et al., 2007). 
Social exchange theory indicates that if employees perceive that the company is 
concerned with their wellbeing, employees will work to benefit the company (Blau, 
1964).  When applying social exchange theory to occupational safety, the theory suggests 
that if safety is seen as a concern, employees will comply with safety requirements, with 
exchanges influencing safety culture as described by Reader, Mearns, Lopes, and Kuha 
(2017).  This is echoed by Zacharatos et al. (2005), who found that if safety is perceived 
as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind. 
In Chapter 2, I will provide additional details about the framework that I used in 
this research.  This will include the applicability to safety culture, and how I conducted 
the study in alignment with the framework. 
Nature of the Study 
The purpose of the qualitative, descriptive phenomenological study was to 
describe executive effectiveness in influencing the safety culture within their 
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organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  Qualitative research is in alignment 
with Antonsen (2009), who confirmed previous research suggesting that qualitative 
analysis of a safety culture may be more appropriate than quantitative analysis.  To 
understand the perception of cultural interventions at executive levels of organizations, I 
interviewed safety professionals at various organizations.  I used safety professionals as 
part of the research to address recommendations highlighted by previous research 
indicating that executives may, when questioned, respond in a manner which indicates 
that they exhibit the expected level of safety engagement, as indicated by Flin (2003).  
The safety professional, on the other hand, has unique access to executive level 
employees, shop floor employees and all management levels in between and has training, 
experience, and education to understand safety culture and implications.  Based on 
experiences, safety professionals are uniquely positioned to describe their perceptions of 
effectiveness of leader interventions on the safety culture of the organization.  This is also 
in alignment with Schein (1990), who expressed the struggle to decipher artifacts of 
culture without an insider’s perspective.  In this study, the safety professional is the 
insider. 
 I asked the participants to participate in interviews consisting of open-ended 
questions.  I designed these questions to elicit the safety professional’s perception of the 
effectiveness of interventions employed by executive levels of management on improving 
the safety culture.  The names of the organizations that the safety professional 
participants represent remained anonymous; as this information was not collected and 
was redacted from the transcript if unintentionally provided by the participant. 
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 My use of the phenomenological research method in the study is similar to other 
phenomenological research conducted to understand the feelings and experiences of 
others, within the realm of occupational health and safety.  Høivik, Moen, Mearns, and 
Haukelid (2009) conducted a phenomenological study on the phenomenon of safety 
culture to produce a description of safety culture at one facility.  Chikudate (2009) 
conducted a phenomenological study to describe the experiences of Japanese train 
companies and post incident learnings.  Burgoyne and Hodgson (1983) conducted 
phenomenological research on learnings of management based on their experiences in the 
workplace.  Catlette (2005) conducted a phenomenological study on the lived experience 
of workplace violence survivors, including their fears, actions within the workplace and 
recommended safety improvements. 
 Following the interview of participants, I analyzed the data by first creating a 
written transcript.  From the transcript, coding occurred to identify themes in the 
responses of participants.  The themes have been reported from the research. 
Definitions 
Safety Commitment: Kark, Katz-Navon and Delegach (2015) define safety 
commitment as the desire to invest in safety as well as the personal values of safety in the 
workplace.  An employee who is committed to a culture of safety follows the rules for 
safety and speaks to peers about working safely because he/she is committed to the goal 
of reducing injuries. 
Safety Culture: Hofmann et al. (2017) defines safety cultures as time-tested values 
and expectations of the organization.  These values are rewarded.  An example of a poor 
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safety culture might be when employees continually see production valued over safety.  
An example of a positive safety culture might be when employees see pauses in 
production to execute a needed safety improvement, designed to prevent injury. 
 Safety Intervention: Hofmann et al. (2017) defines safety intervention as 
tasks/activities that are implemented in a social system.  These tasks/actions may have a 
positive or negative influence on the safety culture. 
 Unsafe Behavior: Li, Lv, Zhu, and Sheng (2018) define unsafe behavior as an 
action taken by an employee that is without regard to direction, rules, procedures, 
training, etc. 
Assumptions 
One of my assumptions for this study was associated with the ability to obtain 
data saturation through solicitation of research participants by use of only one 
professional safety organization.  I selected this organization as I believed it provided 
access to participants who met the inclusion criteria.  However, as I could not reach data 
saturation by working through one organization, it was necessary to identify another 
method of identifying participants while also ensuring the inclusion criteria of safety 
professionals who participated in the research. 
Additional assumptions were associated with the participants and the collection of 
data.  I assumed that the questions that I selected for the interview were the most 
appropriate questions to address the research question.  I also assumed that participants 
would provide honest responses to interview questions and that they are knowledgeable 
in the field to respond to such questions. 
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Scope and Delimitations 
The specific management problem is that some executives use dynamic or on the 
fly leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’ 
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety 
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).  Since Bronkhorst et al. 
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to 
improve safety culture, I focused on the effectiveness of executive interventions on 
influencing a positive safety culture, reducing unsafe behaviors and increasing safety 
performance.  
I conducted interviews with safety professionals, who have a minimum standard 
of education and experience.  The minimum standard of education was a bachelor’s 
degree in safety, environmental, or engineering field; at least 5 years of experience in the 
field of occupational safety; and at least 2 years of experience within the organization in 
which they will describe their experiences.  Participants who were no longer employed by 
the organization that they would describe were not be included in the research, as it was 
possible that their employment status may have resulted in additional bias.   
I conducted interviews with safety professionals from the United States 
representing many different types of organizations (private and public, high and low 
hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.), in order to 
fill a research gap indicated by Fruhen et al. (2013).  I collected data in the form of 
individual interviews, allowing the participant to describe the interventions employed by 
executives within the organization and their perceptions of those interventions.  I 
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conducted the interviews with safety professionals supporting organizations, in order to 
provide a perspective from individuals who understand the importance of safety, how to 
identify concerns, and how to correct hazards. 
Limitations 
A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study outside of the research 
population.  There are generalities that apply; however, the study shows what was 
determined to be most effective safety interventions implemented by the leaders of the 
organizations represented by the research participants.  In order to determine applicability 
outside of the research participants, I have included the context of the research in detail.  
This will allow readers to determine applicability outside of the research population and 
will also assist in ensuring dependability of the study. 
 Another limitation of the study is the knowledge of participants and their ability 
to gauge the intent of leaders within their organization.  In order to minimize this 
potential limitation, each participant holds a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in safety, 
environmental or engineering field, at least 5 years of experience in the field of 
occupational safety, and at least 2 years of experience within the organization in which 
they will describe their experiences. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is unique in that I addressed an under-researched area of the safety 
profession.  This includes the development of safety culture at the senior management 
level within the organization as indicated by Pilbeam et al. (2016) and across different 
types of organizations as indicated by Fruhen et al. (2013), all with the intent of reducing 
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death and injury by creating a positive safety culture.  A positive safety culture reduces 
death and injury within an organization (Neal & Griffin, 2006) and influences positive 
social change through reductions in the loss of life and loss of financial resources 
(Marucci-Wellman et al., 2015). 
Significance to Practice 
The practical application of this study to the safety profession may be to help 
develop training and guidance on actions for senior managers to develop a systematic 
approach to fostering a positive safety culture.  These actions may improve safety culture 
and reduce unsafe acts.  Ultimately, this can result in improved safety performance. 
Significance to Theory 
Executives influence safety culture through their words and deeds, or their 
interventions.  The outcome of this study may produce a better understanding of the 
words and actions, or voice, used by executives to effectively influence safety culture 
regardless of the heuristic and dynamic method employed.  The study may also help to 
identify additional applications of the theory of planned behavior and social exchange 
theory, as applicable to the development of safety culture. 
Significance to Social Change 
The social change that this research may drive is an improvement in safety 
culture, leading to a reduction in occupational death and injuries.  This improvement can 
be brought about by understanding how safety culture cascades through an organization 
through the specific actions of the senior manager to the shop floor employee, then 
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developing a plan to for executive interventions in alignment with the interventions most 
effective at fostering a positive safety culture. 
Summary and Transition 
Each year, United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than 
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly five million more (Hofmann et al., 
2017).  These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the 
economy as nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (Marucci-
Wellman et al., 2015).  The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88% of 
occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and 
beliefs toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive 
safety culture (Zhang et al., 2018).   
 The specific management problem is that executives use dynamic or on the fly 
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’ 
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety 
behaviors and work related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).  Bronkhorst et al. 
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to 
improve safety culture. 
In Chapter 2, I will show how this descriptive phenomenological research study 
on safety professional perceptions of the effectiveness of the influence of executive 
interventions on the safety culture within their organizations fits into the literature gap.  
This may ultimately lead to a greater understanding of how safety professionals perceive 
interventions, the words and actions or voice, of executives may allow for the 
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development of training.  The training could encourage executives to practice 
interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death and 
injury.   
16 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Each year United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than 
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly five million more (Hofmann, Burke, & 
Zohar, 2017).  These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the 
economy, as nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (Marucci-
Wellman et al., 2015).  The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88% 
occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018), which is affected by the 
attitudes and beliefs toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to 
maintaining a positive safety culture (Zhang et al., 2018).  Conversely, if safety is 
perceived as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with 
safety in mind, reducing injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005).   
 The specific management problem is that executives use dynamic or on the fly 
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’ 
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety 
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).  Bronkhorst et al. 
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to 
improve safety culture. 
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe 
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within 
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive interventions; the words and actions or voice, of executives 
may allow for the development of training.  The training could encourage executives to 
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practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death 
and injury.  I asked safety professionals to describe the interventions that have been 
employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of 
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization.  I intended to 
capture the lived experience of the safety professionals as suggested by Giorgi (2009). 
Literature Search Strategy 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide a history of safety management 
and effective influence on safety culture and safety performance.  Reviewing existing 
research identified a gap in literature that my research may address; the interventions of 
executives that result in the greatest improvement to safety culture and performance.  
I conducted at search within the Walden Library for resources in the following 
databases:  Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost, ProQuest, ScienceDirect.  Google 
Scholar was also utilized to access literature.   
Key terms or key phrases included the following: safety culture, safety 
performance, safe behavior, occupational death, management support for safety, 
executive support for safety, safety professional impact safe behavior, safety professional 
impact safety performance, theory of planned behavior, theory of planned management, 
transformational leadership, transactional leadership, phenomenological research, and 
multifaceted intervention (intervention at various levels of the organization). 
I combined key terms to further investigate the relationship between terms.  These 
terms included:  front-line leadership/safety culture, safety culture/safety performance, 
safe behavior/manager, occupational death/injury, occupational injury/management, 
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transformational leadership/safety, transactional leadership/safety, 
phenomenological/safety, phenomenological/management, phenomenological/research, 
and multifaceted intervention/safety. 
Theoretical Foundation 
I situated this study between the gaps identified by Pilbeam et al. (2016) and 
Fruhen et al. (2013) by describing the lived experience of the safety professional as safety 
culture develops within the organization.  I analyzed the artifacts of culture through the 
lived experiences of organizational insiders, to make deciphering the artifacts possible, as 
explained by Schein (1990).   
 I selected the framework for this study to draw upon the theory of planned 
behavior and social exchange theory.  Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior, 
suggests that employee behavior is based on the norms accepted by significant 
individuals in the organization, which includes managers.  Montano and Kasprzyk (2015) 
proposed the use of the theory of planned behavior in conjunction with the theory of 
planned action in order to consider accepted norms as well as attitudes, behaviors, and 
feelings of control.  These theories are applicable to safety culture as employee safety 
attitude and behavior have been found to be influenced by an organization's safety 
culture, which is based on the organization's beliefs and attitude toward safety (Choudhry 
et al., 2007). 
Since the theory of planned behavior is good at explaining behavior, it is often 
used to measure interventions used to modify culture.  Steinmetz, Knappstein, Ajzen, 
Schmidt, and Kabst (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 123 interventions conducted 
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utilizing the theory of planned behavior.  “The theory states that the main driver for 
behavior is the intention to perform the behavior.  The intention, in turn, is a function of 
underlying motivational variables (i.e., attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and 
perceived behavioral control)” (Steinmetz, et al., 2016).  This meta-analysis also 
confirmed the usefulness of the theory of planned behavior in designing interventions 
intended to change behavior.   
Social exchange theory indicates that if employees perceive that the company is 
concerned with their well being, employees will work to benefit the company (Blau, 
1964).  When applying social exchange theory to occupational safety, the theory suggests 
that if safety is seen as a concern, employees will comply with safety requirements, with 
exchanges influencing safety culture as described by Reader, Mearns, Lopes and Kuha 
(2017).  This is echoed by Zacharatos et al. (2005) who found that if safety is perceived 
as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind.  
The perception commitment of management commitment to safety predicts behavior 
(Zohar & Polachek, 2014).   
From a functional perspective, climate perceptions should refer to policies-in-use, 
or enacted policies, rather than to their formal counterparts, because only the 
former inform employees of the probable organizational consequences of acting 
safely (vs. speedily).  Thus, a consensus should occur when management and 
peers display an internally consistent pattern of action concerning safety, even if it 
differs from the formally declared policy.  For example, site managers might 
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expect workers to cut corners whenever production falls behind schedule, despite 
official claims to the contrary 
(Zohar & Polachek, 2014, p.377).   
Reader et al. (2017) found that health and wellness initiatives implemented by 
employers similarly influenced employee perception of concern by employers and lead to 
increased safety behaviors.  Employees perceive that their safe behaviors are reciprocity 
for the concern expressed by employers.  Mullen, Kelloway, and Teed (2017), conducted 
a study utilizing social exchange theory framework, in which they indicate that future 
research is needed to assess the impact of the interventions that can improve safety 
leadership and encourage employee safety behaviors to prevent incidents.  My study 
focused on the perception of the effectiveness of influence of executives on the safety 
culture of the organization. 
Literature Review 
Occupational Incidents and Safety Culture  
Each year United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than 
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly five million more (Hofmann et al., 
2017).  Occupational injuries effect employees, employers, and the general economy, yet 
it is difficult and imprecise to calculate losses, as assumptions are made that change 
across generations, genders, and family status (Lebeau, Duguay, & Boucher, 2014).  As 
Serrier, Sultan-Taieb, Luce, and Bejean (2014), indicated, occupational incidents have 
"an impact on economic growth by affecting the labor supply, in particular through the 
number of working days lost because of illness or accident and the reduced productivity 
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of employees at work" (p.661).  Marucci-Wellman et al. (2015) estimated an annual 
impact to the United States’ economy of nearly $50 billion dollars on direct medical costs 
alone and an impact of $600 billion over the course of the research (1998–2010).  While 
the number of occupational injury cases in the United States has been reduced yearly, the 
costs has not; it is unknown if this is due to more severe injuries, an aging workforce, or 
more costly treatment (Marucci-Wellman et al., 2015).  Despite limitations, studies 
calculating the costs of occupational injuries are conducted with the intent to highlight 
the appropriate path forward and the importance of research and injury prevention 
(Lebeau et al., 2014).  For example, Serrier, Sultan-Taieb, Luce, and Bejean (2014) found 
that the cost of occupational lung cancer can cost between 500,000 to 1.5 million Euros.  
The study showed that asbestos exposure, which can result in occupational cancer, is 
avoidable through the use of existing technology and preventative measures, which 
means that the most effective means is to prevent, rather than treat occupational cancer as 
a result of asbestos exposure (Serrier et al., 2014).  Similarly, Fabius et al. (2013) built on 
previous research which indicated that every dollar spent on the medical bills of an 
occupational injury resulted in an additional $2.13 lost by the company.  The results 
showed that there is a correlation between organizations that reduce health and safety 
risks and those that outperform the market (Fabius et al., 2013).  In order to prevent 
incidents, the cause must be understood. 
In many cases, investigations associated with occupational incidents show that 
noncompliance with safety procedures is a root cause of incidents (Dahl & Olsen, 2013).  
Historical research and current research showed that a contributing cause in nearly all 
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occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018).  Research conducted by 
Shea et al. (2016) showed significant correlation between occupational injury occurrence 
and employee attitude toward safety.  Employee safety attitude and behavior are 
influenced by an organization's safety culture, which is based on the organization's beliefs 
and attitude toward safety (Choudhry et al., 2007) and exhibited in the behaviors of 
employees (Brettel et al., 2015).   
 Employee behaviors were explained in the the Deepwater Horizon incident 
investigation through analyzing the oil rig fire that killed 11, injured 16 and cost $34 
billion in medical claims and legal settlements (Reader & O’Connor, 2014).  This event 
demonstrates the association between leadership acceptance of unsafe behaviors, 
unrealistic production expectations, and the occurrence of serious occupational incidents 
(Oudhuis & Tengblad, 2018).  Unsafe behavior is formed by the attitudes and beliefs 
toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive safety 
culture (Zhang et al., 2018).  Conversely, when a positive safety culture is evident, 
injuries will be reduced as all employees will be continually looking out for and 
correcting hazards before injuries occur (Vredenbrugh, 2002).  If safety is perceived as a 
value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind, 
reducing injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005).  This is especially important when considering 
that management is responsible for addressing conflicts between strategic goals such as 
safety and production (Engemann & Scott, 2018).  One way in which leaders can 
influence the development of a safety culture is through leadership styles.   
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The leadership style embraced by organizational leaders can influence employee 
safety culture, behavior, and ultimately safety performance (Clarke, 2013).  Kark, Katz-
Navon, and Delegach, (2015) described two types of employee safety behavior: voluntary 
proactive behaviors and mandatory compliance behaviors.  The voluntary behaviors are 
often driven by leadership styles, which result in employees working to improve 
conditions and practices and a reduced rate of injury.  For example, while transactional 
leadership has been found to elicit the minimum response required to maintain safety 
compliance, leadership in the form of transformational leadership has been shown to 
reduce the occurrence of injuries by improving the safety culture of the organization 
(Clarke, 2013).  A true and genuine compassion for employees must be exhibited by a 
leader in order to truly demonstrate transformational leadership as it applies to safety 
management (Clarke, 2013).  When leaders encourage and motivate their employees 
using transformational leadership styles, the employees ultimately adopt the value of the 
leader, adopting values that improve the safety culture within the organization and 
increase the proactive safety behaviors of employees (Clarke, 2013).  Transactional 
leadership, on the other hand, typically fosters mere compliance in safety, as it rewards 
the right behavior and punishes bad behavior (Clarke, 2013).   
 Karim (2016) evaluated the relationship between transformational leadership and 
safety climate in the Pakistani pharmaceutical industry.  The study showed a positive 
relationship between transformational leadership and safety climate.   
The core concept of safety climate is that they are formed on the basis of practical 
and visible actions taken by an organization to improve the safety situation.  So a 
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leadership style like transformational leadership is a kind of action which can be 
seen by the workforce which helps to form and improve their perception about the 
safety climate that is evident. (Karim, 2016, p.509) 
 Kark et al. (2015) developed a study based on the recommendations for future 
studies of the Clark (2013) study; identifying the mechanisms that make transactional and 
transformational leadership successful.  The study indicated that "when the leader is 
perceived as transformational, he or she is able to enhance a variety of behaviors 
contributing to organizational safety including those of compliance" (p.1343).  
 Similarly, the differences between positional and inspirational leaders can impact 
safety culture.  Positional leaders achieve results by telling people what to do because 
they have power over them, while inspirational leaders achieve results because they are 
passionate about the cause and are able to clearly communicate the why and the 
importance of acting in a certain way (Cooper, 2015).  Thus, inspirational leaders often 
inspire others to comply (Cooper, 2015). 
 Safety behavior is composed of participation and compliance, where compliance 
is mandatory and participation is not.  To sustain a reduction in injuries, safety 
participation must be a focus, over mere safety compliance (Clarke 2013).  This focus is 
derived from management, from front line to executives. 
 With regard to safety culture and the front line employee, the most consistent 
demonstration of safety culture and the most important relationship molding the safety 
culture of the employee comes from their direct manager (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989).  
Kapp (2012) found that the relationship between the front line employee and their direct 
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supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance.  Supervisors who place 
greater value on safety experience greater compliance, while those who place lower value 
on safety experience lower levels of compliance (Kapp, 2012).  The study conducted by 
Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006) found that positive exchanges between 
employees and supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors, impacting safety 
performance because those with high quality relationships feel as though they can express 
concerns with workplace safety, resulting in fewer accidents.  Zohar and Polachek 
(2014), investigated the effect of communications from the front line manager on the 
safety culture and resulting safety performance of shop floor employees.  When there was 
communication from the front-line manager to the shop floor employees, the results 
found improvements to safety behavior and culture, teamwork and safety performance 
(Zohar & Polachek, 2014).   
 Michael et al. (2006) found that positive exchanges between employees and 
supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors, impacting safety performance.  This occurs 
because those with high quality relationships feel as though they can express concerns 
with workplace safety, resulting in fewer accidents (Michael et al., 2006).   
 Kapp (2012) found that the relationship between the front line employee and their 
direct supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance (Kapp, 2012).  
Supervisors who place greater value on safety experience greater compliance, while those 
who place lower value on safety experience lower levels of compliance (Kapp, 2012).  
Similarly, Dahl & Olsen (2013), hypothesized that worker compliance would increase 
with leadership involvement.  The results of the study confirm previous research, which 
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identifies that leaders who emphasize the importance of safety realize greater safety 
performance (Dahl & Olsen, 2013).   
 The connection between safety culture development and the direct manager of the 
front line employee is vital, however, the direct manager also oversees quality and 
production, among other business aspects (Witherill & Kolak, 1996).  A study conducted 
by Nordlöf, Wiitavaara, Winblad, Wijk, and Westerling (2015) in Sweeden, in a high risk 
metalworking facility.  In this type of organization, the rate of significant days away from 
work (> 90) is nearly twice the average of other high risk industries.  For that reason, is 
important to understand the drivers of injuries.  The results of this study showed that 
management expectations, leading to a trade off of safety for productivity, were the main 
reasons for employee risk taking (Nordlöf et al., 2015).  In the example of the Deepwater 
Horizon catastrophe, employees were rewarded for cost-cutting measures and on time 
production delivery, not for safety performance (Smith, 2011).  It is for this reason that 
the direct manager of the front line employee may not convey the same level of 
enthusiasm and level of commitment as the senior management demonstrates.  This 
research intended to fill gaps in existing research as well as address limitations in recent 
studies. 
 Pilbeam et al. (2016) found that the relationship between the front line supervisor 
and his/her direct reports have been studied, while other leadership relationships (such as 
senior managers) that set the tone for safety culture within their organizations are in need 
of investigation.  Where studies have been conducted, their transferability is limited.  A 
study was conducted by Fruhen et al. (2014) since previous research indicated that senior 
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leaders had significant influence on safety culture but did not explain which 
characteristics of the senior leader had the greatest effect.  The study indicated that policy 
making of senior leaders was key to influence of safety among air traffic management 
companies (Fruhen et al., 2014).  Biggs et al. (2013) found that leaders identified 
leadership and visibility as the primary, effective means to implementing a positive safety 
culture in the Australian construction industry.  
 Antonsen (2009) found that organizations struggle with ensuring that the safety 
culture of the executive leadership team is conveyed to shop for employees through their 
front line supervisor (Antonsen, 2009).  Most recently, it has been found that senior 
leaders use dynamic or on the fly leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017) which raise 
concerns about leaders’ interventions on safety culture and the implications of those 
interventions on safety behaviors and work related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).   
 In alignment with the recommendations of Sheehan, Donohue, Shea, Cooper and 
De Cieri (2016), the data to be used in my research will be collected from across the 
United States, representing many different types of organizations (private and public, 
high and low hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, 
etc.) and across multiple organizations and those which do not represent only blue collar 
jobs.   
 My research collected information from safety professionals supporting various 
organizations.  This is in alignment with Vredenbrugh (2002) who stressed the 
importance of “research concerning culture frequently focuses upon key informants who 
are identified as those possessing special or more complete knowledge than others in the 
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organization” (p.266).  The safety professional has access to all levels of employees; 
from senior management to shop floor employees.  Olle-Espluga et al., (2014) also 
acknowledged the unique perspective of safety professionals in assessing management 
attitudes and safety climate.  My study also addresses a limitation of the Michael et al. 
(2006) study, by collecting information from the perspective of the safety professional; 
not senior leaders, the supervisor or shop floor employees measuring themselves.   
Flin (2003) found that senior leaders are more likely to share what they believe 
are the safety related responses of a senior leader; rather than their actual beliefs.  My 
study reviewed the attitude and commitment of the senior leader through their 
interactions with their organization’s safety professional.  This is in alignment with 
Fruhen et al. (2014) who suggested researching the views of other employees in the 
organizational hierarchy.  Specifically, Fruhen et al. (2014) found that including other 
individuals within the organizational hierarchy can “help identify whether senior 
managers’ personal characteristics differ in their influence on safety at different 
organizational levels” (p.18).  This research aimed to fill the identified gap by identifying 
which characteristics, at the senior manager organizational levels, have been identified as 
having the greatest impact on safety culture and safety performance (Fruhen et al., 2014).  
One of the limitations presented in the research of Dahl & Olsen (2013) is that the 
questionnaire did not consider the different hierarchical levels of leaders in their analysis.  
Dahl and Olsen’s study (2013) has an identified limitation that my research filled; 
assessing leadership engagement at various organizational levels.  
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Bronkhorst (2018) revealed significant improvement in the perception of senior 
management priority of safety after conducting walk arounds on the shop floor.  
However, the study was unable to indicate which intervention at which hierarchical level 
had the greatest effect on safety culture improvement.  "Future studies could try to 
develop intervention studies using various treatment arms to disentangle individual 
effects and fruitful combinations." (Bronkhorst, 2018, p.28).  Bronkhorst (2018) also 
identified a limitation of the study was that there was no qualitative data collected on the 
interventions to understand the why and the how of the effectiveness of the intervention. 
Noncompliance with safety procedures is a root cause in a majority of 
investigations, which “underlines the importance of identifying the organizational factors 
that affect the level of safety compliant behavior” (Dahl & Olsen, 2013, p.17).   
Development of Safety Culture 
During 2014, the United States’ working population witnessed the death of 
greater than 4,600 individuals who reported to work for the day with the intent of 
providing for their livelihood (Hofmann et al., 2017).  Several million additional 
individuals are injured at work each year, causing various levels disability, which result 
in hardships to the family of the injured employee and society as a whole (Hofmann et 
al., 2017).  The direct costs of injuries alone cost the United States’ economy 
approximately $50 billion dollars per year (Marucci-Wellman, Courtney, Corns, Sorock, 
Webster, Wasiak, & Leamon, 2015). 
Unsafe behaviors are “affected by an organization’s socially transmitted beliefs 
and attitudes toward safety” (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.260).  The organization’s beliefs and 
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attitudes toward safety form an organization’s safety culture, which influences employee 
safety behavior (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007).  When a positive safety culture is 
evident, injuries will be reduced as all employees will be continually looking out for and 
correcting hazards before injuries occur (Vredenbrugh, 2002).   
Connection Between Incidents and Unsafe Behavior 
There are nearly 20 employees killed each day and nearly 20,000 injured in the 
US, however a contributing cause in nearly all is unsafe behavior (Vredenburgh, 2002).  
This is supported by previous research that indicates that “safety performance is affected 
by an organization’s socially transmitted beliefs and attitudes toward safety” 
(Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.260).  Vredenburgh (2002) indicates that the goal of a positive 
safety culture is to have all employees continually looking out for and correcting hazards.  
“A safety culture motivates and recognizes safe behavior by focusing on the attitudes and 
behaviors of the employees (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.260).  This research was conducted by 
NIOSH and involved surveying risk managers from ~60 hospitals throughout the United 
States.  Risk managers were interviewed as “research concerning culture frequently 
focuses upon key informants who are identified as those possessing special or more 
complete knowledge than others in the organization” (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.266).  It is 
for this reason that the proposed research will include interviewing safety professionals 
regarding their perceptions of safety culture within organizations.  The Vrendenbrugh 
study (2002) involved surveying the participants on elements of safety culture, as they 
were employed at the hospital.  Such items included training, management commitment, 
communication and feedback, selection and participation.  Injury rates and injury severity 
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were also considered.  With regards to findings, “The most important finding of this 
study is that when organizations take proactive measures to protect their employees, the 
company derives a financial benefit in reduced lost time and workers compensation 
expenses.  While previous research has typically discussed management practices as 
general goals, the current study systematically examined the specific elements of these 
practices that predict employee injury rates (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.273). 
Typical workplace safety programs 
Safety programs are often built around the ability of an employee to recognize 
hazards (Albert, Hallowell & Kleiner, 2013).  However, research indicated that in the 
construction industry, approximately 38% of hazards are identified.  This means that the 
ability to prevent accidents by identifying hazards is significantly lower than desired.  In 
order to facilitate change, this research began with 14 safety professionals coming 
together to develop a classroom and field training program intended to improve the 
recognition of hazards.  To ensure construction employees were engaged and willing to 
accept change, the process consisted of the following: explaining the risk of uncorrected 
hazards, explaining the impact to the worker and their family, explaining what constitutes 
a hazard, training with the use of mnemonics to help enhance recognition and providing 
instruction on how to correct hazards.  The result was a 31% improvement in the 
recognition of hazards over the course of 1 year and 8 sessions.  This research will be 
used as part of the proposed research to begin investigating how the safety professional 
impacts the front line employee commitment to safety and any mediating role the safety 
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professional has compared to the effect of executive level commitment to safety on the 
front line employee. 
Impact of safety professionals 
Olsen (2012) recognized that safety professionals within an organization are often 
viewed as technical in their approach.  Therefore, when strategic organizational decisions 
are required, input from the safety professional may not be considered.  However, tactics 
employed by safety professionals can allow them to have strategic impact by influencing 
the change process.  Previous research indicated that safety professionals prefer to work 
within the areas of regulation and technical knowledge but does not identify the methods 
that are used by those who work strategically to implement change.  To conduct the study 
addressing this gap, 10 safety professionals were interviewed.  A qualitative analysis was 
conducted where participants shared examples of changes that they have facilitated and 
how they did so.  Some of the methods employed with middle managers included 
expressing buy in from upper management, trying to get middle managers to understand 
their responsibility for safety (which produced various levels of success, ranging from 
managers writing operating procedures including safety means to safety professionals 
filing incident reports on behalf; mostly due to management engagement).  Most safety 
professionals worked with site committees and all identified the importance of 
influencing stakeholders.  The trend was that knowledge was used to influence others, 
followed by auditing to show deficiencies and share with senior management.  This 
research was used as part of my research to begin investigating how the safety 
professional impacts management commitment to safety and any mediating role the 
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safety professional has on middle and front line management’s commitment compared to 
the impact of executive level commitment to safety. 
Leadership styles of management and the impact on safety 
Clarke (2013) conducted a meta analytic review of existing research on 
transactional and transformational leadership.  Transformational leadership has been seen 
to increase proactive safety behavior in employees.  Transactional leadership, on the 
other hand, typically fosters compliance in safety, as it rewards the right behavior and 
punishes bad behavior.  Clarke (2013) has identified that it is likely appropriate to use a 
combination of both styles; in order to first ensure compliance and then establish 
proactive behavior.  One limitation of the study is that there must be further research on 
how to implement the results of this study.   
According to Karim (2016), every 15 seconds, a person dies in a work related 
incident and that rate of injury is even higher when unemployment is high as there is less 
consideration for workplace health and safety.  The study intended to indicate the 
relationship between transformational leadership and safety climate in the Pakistani 
pharmaceutical industry.  Questionnaires were distributed with a rate of return greater 
than 75%, indicating a positive relationship between transformational leadership and 
safety climate.  “The core concept of safety climate is that they are formed on the basis of 
practical and visible actions taken by organization to improve the safety situation.  So a 
leadership style like transformational leadership is kind of action which can be seen by 
the workforce which helps to form and improve their perception about the safety climate 
that is evident” (p.509).  The study indicated the disproval of a hypothesis associated with 
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safety attitudes mediating safety knowledge and safety climate.  However, the authors 
further hypothesize that the individuals involved in the study did not develop a positive 
safety attitude (despite safety knowledge) because their religion (Muslim) indicates that 
destiny will determine whether or not an injury occurs and there is no intervening 
measure that can then prevent such an event. 
Uhl-Bien (2006) presents the theory of relational leadership as a framework to 
study the leadership that, among other things, influences values, attitudes and their 
corresponding behaviors.  Relational leadership is associated with the connections 
formed between organizations and their members.  Uhl-Bien (2006) explains how 
relationship is the new form of leadership; rather than power and authority.  The article 
also indicated the need to research the development of the research (through relational 
leadership theory) as opposed to simply observations of the quality of relationships 
(through leader member exchange). 
Organizational culture can have an effect on worker behavior; leadership style can 
be a determinant of safety behavior and thus, safety performance.  While transactional 
leadership has been found to elicit the minimum response required to maintain safety 
compliance, safety leadership in the form of transformational leadership has been shown 
to reduce the occurrence of injuries by improving the safety culture/safety behavior of the 
organization (Clarke, 2013).  When leaders encourage and motivate their employees 
through the practice of transformational leadership, the employees ultimately adopt the 
value of the leader.  Thus, when the leader is transformational, the employees adopt 
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values that improve the safety culture/safety behavior within the organization (Clarke, 
2013).   
Container terminals are hazardous locations, resulting of the death of nearly 100 
people each year with nearly an additional 100,000 injured (Lu & Yang, 2010).  “The 
United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has recognized the 
power of leadership and pointed to management leadership as a key element in safety 
issues.  Safety leadership that motivates team members to work harder, to work 
efficiently, and to take ownership of responsibility for safety performance is encouraged” 
(Lu & Yang, 2010, p.123).  The results of this study indicated three dimensions of safety 
leadership.  These dimensions included safety motivation, policy and concern.  The 
findings of this study are relevant to my research as these terms are included in the 
questions included in the interview process. 
Curcuruto, Conchie, Mariani, and Violante (2015) were able to demonstrate the 
effect of transformational leadership by measuring employee engagement in safety and 
safety behaviors compared to safety performance.  Leaders who empower their 
employees are generally associated with the development of positive behaviors while a 
strict adherence to a hierarchical reporting structure is not (Lee, Idris & Delfabbro, 2016).   
Transformational leadership leads to improved safety perception, safety culture 
and provide guidance for training and program development (Clarke, 2013).  The 
leadership style embraced by organizational leaders can be a determinant of safety 
performance.  For example, while transactional leadership has been found to elicit the 
minimum response required to maintain safety compliance, safety leadership in the form 
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of transformational leadership has been shown to reduce the occurrence of injuries by 
improving the safety culture of the organization (Clarke, 2013).  In the realm of 
occupational safety, performance can be impacted by transformational and transactional 
leadership styles.  A true and genuine compassion for employees must be exhibited by a 
leader in order to truly demonstrate transformational leadership as it applies to safety 
management (Clarke, 2013).  When leaders encourage and motivate their employees, the 
employees ultimately adopt the value of the leader.  Thus, when the leader is 
transformational, the employees adopt values that improve the safety culture within the 
organization (Clarke, 2013).   
Hierarchical structure relating to incidents and safety performance 
A study conducted by Hill, Seo, Kang, and Taylor (2012) found that top 
management impact on change in an organization was related to their hierarchal distance 
from employee.  The Brettel, Chomik, and Flatten (2015) study involved the review of 
entrepreneurial orientation, leading to better performance.  A negative relationship was 
found between entrepreneurial orientation and the impact of hierarchical culture (Brettel, 
Chomik, & Flatten, 2015).  This study filled a gap in existing research as previous 
research indicated the link but failed to identify how culture impacts entrepreneurial 
orientation/organizational success.  Culture of the organization is exhibited in the 
behaviors of employees.  Group culture is based on trust and mutual respect, where 
hierarchical culture is based on rules, control, structure and regulations.  The concern for 
an organization is that the organization will be less innovative with employees at lower 
levels feeling powerless.  Other barriers of hierarchical cultures include slow 
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communication, slow decision making and a lack of trusts between departments which 
negatively impacts the flow of knowledge.  This research includes a great example of a 
purpose statement, indicating that “the primary purpose of this study is to investigate 
whether organizational culture plays a significant role in determining the levels of 
innovativeness, proactivness and risk-taking” in small and medium businesses (Brettel, 
Chomik, & Flatten, 2015, p.869).  This article also includes a great example of the 
explaining theoretical foundations.  This research provides references to seminal works 
providing the definition of culture.  Proactiveness is yet another dimension of 
entrepreneurial orientation and is a strategic resource.   
Organizational culture can have an effect on worker behavior.  Empowering 
leaders and hierarchical culture are two traits exhibited as part of organizational culture 
(Lee, Idris, & Delfabbro, 2016).  However, empowering leaders is generally associated 
with the development of positive behaviors while hierarchical culture is not.  This study 
intended to review the effects of both traits, combined.  The longitudinal study identified 
that while empowering leadership increased work engagement, but the study did not 
demonstrate that work engagement was reduced in the presence of a hierarchical culture.  
This study was interesting, in that the authors were not able to observe what they 
hypothesized; that a hierarchal culture would have a negative impact on worker behavior.  
This study is interesting, as other studies have demonstrated the expected results.  An 
interesting follow up, case study would include a review of the culture present in the 
organization that mediated the effect of the hierarchical culture.   
Manager impact on safety at work 
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With regards to safety culture and the front line employee, the most consistent 
demonstration of safety culture comes from the relationship with their direct manager 
(Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989).  However, the direct manager of the front line employee 
oversees safety, quality and production, among other business aspects (Witherill & 
Kolak, 1996).  It is for this reason that the direct manager of the front line employee may 
not convey the same level of enthusiasm and level of commitment as the executive leader 
demonstrates.  Zohar, D., & Polachek, T. (2014) focused on whether or not safety climate 
and performance would be impacted by educating managers.  The study was comprised 
of two groups; one that was educated on the importance of integrating safety into their 
management style and the impact on productivity.  The other group received no feedback.  
“Results of this intervention study indicate that changes in supervisory messages 
indicative of modified priorities among role facets during routine communications with 
group members resulted in corresponding changes in safety climate, safety behavior, 
subjective workload, teamwork, and (externally measured) safety audit levels “ (p.120).  
Since the same effect was not observed in the control group, this indicates that worker 
climate perceptions and behavior improved as a result of the feedback aimed to improve 
supervisor discourse regarding the operationalization of safety. 
Karim (2016) found that there was little impact on safety climate caused by safety 
knowledge.  This is interesting, as it means that the majority of the influence for safety 
climate is caused by the influence of supervisors.  This study is important because it is 
carried out in a Pakistani pharmaceutical company as compared to previous research that 
has been conducted in Western organizations.  Despite the difference in the working 
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population (where most individuals are illiterate in the Pakistani workforce) the 
leadership characteristics employed by the supervisor in the form of transformational 
leadership were found to influence the safety climate of employees. 
The Role of Leadership and Leaders’ Behavioral Characteristics on Employees’ 
Safety Behavior in Plant Turnaround Maintenance of PETRONAS Petrochemical 
Companies in Malaysia focused on transformational and transactional research and found 
results similar to other studies.  However, additionally, this study showed that safety 
motivation can be a moderator between management's leadership style and employee's 
safety behavior.  This study is of interest because it took place in a non western country 
and in a facility that was attempting a turn around.  The fact that the facility needed to 
make drastic changes is important, because these are often times when employee 
motivation and engagement can be low, due to other operational challenges.  Despite this, 
the study was still able to show a relationship between employee behaviors and 
leadership styles.  Transactional leadership drives compliance while transactional 
leadership drives participation and worker engagement. 
Bandow, Self and Self (2014) found that managers that fail to manage employees 
subject their organization to losing the high performers and retaining the poor performers 
or problem employees and their associated liabilities.  Poor performance is noticed by 
other employees and at times, management is the unintended cause.  Poor management 
continues to allow poor performers as managers fail to take responsibility for their role in 
performance or do not know how to respond at all.  In other cases, management feels like 
they are allowing employees to redeem themselves with another chance when in reality, 
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they do nothing.  For high performers, this do nothing approach can lead to low morale.  
Previous research has indicated that managers often do not like to deliver bad news of 
poor performance even when performance appraisals are accurate.  One step that 
organizations can take is to ensure proper training of managers, so that they document 
performance, feedback and formal coaching.  To help facilitate this, one recommendation 
is for experienced managers to develop a script for dealing with underperforming 
employees so that less experienced employees can learn, and the organization can 
maintain a standard approach. 
Cooper (2015), identified that there is a difference between positional and 
inspirational leaders.  Positional leaders achieve results by telling people what to do; 
because they have power over them.  Inspirational leaders achieve results because they 
are passionate about the cause and are able to clearly communicate the “why” and the 
importance of acting in a certain way.  Thus, they often inspire others to comply.  Safety 
leaders are most successful when they adopt the servant style of leadership.  Using this 
style, they facilitate the fulfillment of others’ needs.  
Duhigg (2016) found that working in groups helps to solve problems, come up 
with creative solutions and recognize errors or mistakes faster.  All of these help, but 
questions remained about what makes a good team.  Some believed that putting similar 
people together worked best, others believed that friends outside of work comprised the 
best teams.  Google undertook a study to determine what qualities fostered the best 
teams.  Google learned that the best managers are good at communicating and avoid 
micromanaging, but wanted to know what makes the successful teams, successful.  They 
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could not find correlation with groups that were friends, groups that were outgoing, 
groups that were shy, groups that preferred very structured groups, groups that preferred 
no hierarchy at all.  Then, Google began to look at team culture and norms.  They found 
that norms differed significantly.  They turned to past research, which showed that the 
way people treated each other is what mattered.  In this past research, random teams were 
formed.  The tasks required compromise to succeed.  Typically, if a group came up with a 
way to succeed in one task, they succeeded in all.  The converse was also true.  These 
team members have mutual respect for each other, tend not to try to embarrass each other 
and create a safe space for risk taking.  One group at Google decided to informally test 
the results.  They found that though their group was all high performers, they were not 
working together well.  The leader believed that having respect for each other and feeling 
safe together and learning to recognize the feelings of others would be facilitated by his 
sharing of extremely personal information about his illness.  Empathy and sensitivity may 
go a long way in fostering team collaboration and team success. 
Borgogni, Dello, Russo, and Latham (2011) found that an employee’s satisfaction 
and commitment to their organization is based on their perception of the abilities of their 
team, which is based on leader’s influence.  Previous studies have identified a 
relationship between employee’s perceptions of the abilities of the team and the actual 
performance of the team.  This study was intended to research the perceptions of the 
abilities of the team and the perception of the leaders affected satisfaction with the job 
and commitment to the organization.  A leader can affect the effectiveness of the team 
and perception of effectiveness by helping the group reach their goals, by providing 
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feedback and facilitating teamwork amongst members of the team.  The highest levels of 
management are also key to an employee’s perception of the abilities of the organization, 
as top leaders can develop procedures and goals that may or may not align groups.  This 
is important as previous studies found that job satisfaction is related to the perception of 
the immediate leader.  Similarly, level of perceived support was found to correlate to 
commitment to an organization.   
The significance of these findings for the workplace is that they show that 
employees’ positive perceptions of their immediate supervisor are more strongly 
related to the formulation of their beliefs regarding their group’s efficacy than 
their perceptions of top management.  However, since groups are embedded in an 
organizational setting, group members’ positive perceptions of top management 
are also related to their beliefs of their group’s collective efficacy…To strengthen 
confidence in one’s group’s efficacy, the novelty of our findings suggests working 
on self-efficacy and perceptions of leadership.  We propose a specific training 
aimed at managing the relationship with the supervisor. (Borgogni, p.10) 
The Kapp (2012) study indicated that the relationship between the front line 
employee and their direct supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance.  
Supervisors who place greater value on safety experience greater compliance.  Those 
who place lower value on safety experience lower levels of compliance. 
When considering fiscal responsibility, O’Toole (2002), identified that employers 
must implement programs that will provide the greatest return on investment.  For that 
reason, it is important to consider the impact that safety culture has on reducing injures 
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and whether or not it is worth the investment.  In a longitudinal study (conducted over 45 
months) at a concrete manufacturing plant, it was determined that employee’s positive 
perceptions impacted reductions in injuries, with management’s commitment to safety 
having the greatest impact on employee’s perceptions (O’Toole, 2002).   
The study conducted by Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006), was 
conducted through the completion of nearly 600 questionnaires from employees working 
in 5, Pennsylvania wood manufacturing companies.  The study showed that positive 
exchanges between employees and supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors, 
impacting safety performance.  This is able to occur because those with high quality 
relationships feel as though they can express concerns with workplace safety, resulting in 
fewer accidents.  Again, this study indicated a limitation in the self reporting of safety 
behaviors.  The proposed research is intended to help fill this gap, by collecting 
information from the perspective of the safety professional; not the supervisor or shop 
floor employees measuring themselves.  This can help to eliminate bias. 
Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, and Mbaye (2015) conducted a study on first line 
managers and their perceptions of risk in the job, level of involvement in safety and 
perceived safety climate (Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, & Mbaye, 2015).  The research of first 
line managers (66) in France indicated that the greater the perceived risk, the more 
involved the manager became (Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, & Mbaye, 2015).   
A study was conducted by Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, and Kirwan (2014) because 
literature reviews indicated that there was research that indicated that senior leaders had 
significant influence on safety culture but did not explain which characteristics of the 
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senior leader had the most effect.  The study indicated was that policy making of senior 
leaders was key to influence of safety.  This research was conducted utilizing air traffic 
management companies.  This research also indicated the need to review the views of 
other employees in the organizational hierarchy.  Specifically, the study indicated that 
“inclusion of more junior managers and the workforce can help identify whether senior 
managers’ personal characteristics differ in their influence on safety at different 
organizational levels” (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin & Kirwan, 2014, p.18).  My research aimed 
to fill the identified gap by identifying which characteristics, at different organizational 
levels, have been identified as having the greatest impact on safety culture and safety 
performance. 
Yorio and Wachter (2014) conducted a study to focus on employee behaviors, 
which are often implicated in serious occupational incidents.  This research is pertinent to 
my research as it is necessary to understand how employee behaviors correlate to safety 
culture and the perceptions of management commitment to safety.  In fact, this study 
indicated a need for future research in assessing the effect of safety and health 
management on human performance include a review over time.   My research will 
review health and safety management, from the perception of the safety professional, 
over a period of time. 
A study was conducted by Nordlöf, Wiitavaara, Winblad, Wijk, and Westerling, 
(2015), in Sweeden, in a high risk metalworking facility.  In this type of organization, the 
rate of significant days away from work (> 90) is nearly twice the average of other high 
risk industries.  For that reason, is important to understand the drivers of injuries.  Culture 
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is found to be a significant indicator of injuries; from Chernobyl to the Challenger space 
shuttle.  Management’s commitment to safety behavior is part of safety culture, and 
influences whether or not workers carry out risky behaviors.  The results of this study 
indicated that management expectations, leading to a trade off of safety for productivity, 
were the main reasons for employee risk taking. 
Choudry (2014) identified that behavior based safety is one manner in which to 
improve safety performance.  This is especially pertinent as a behavior-based safety 
program requires front line leadership engagement.  This is an example of how front-line 
leaders can exhibit such significant influence over shop floor employees, which is the 
focus of the proposed research.  In this article, the researchers follow employees in the 
construction industry.  Safe behaviors (leading indicators of safety performance) are 
reviewed on a weekly basis.  With positive (and negative) reinforcement for observed 
behaviors, as well as continuous training, the researchers were able to observe an increase 
in safe behaviors from 80% to 95% after 9 weeks!  This is an example of how front line 
management can drive habits, behaviors and attitudes of employees.  The front line 
managers were successful because they demonstrated their genuine concern for their 
employees and commitment to successful implementation of the behavior based safety 
program. 
The study conducted by Flin (2003) reviewed the different roles that various 
management levels play in the development of safety culture, behavior and safety 
performance.  The study indicated that senior management commitment to safety be 
measured periodically.  It also suggests that senior leaders are more likely, when asked, 
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share what they believe are the safety related responses of a senior leader; rather than 
their actual beliefs.  This observation is the reason why the proposed research includes 
the study of the attitude and commitment of the senior leader through their interactions 
with their organization’s safety professional. 
 “Accident analyses and investigations regularly identify a lack of compliance 
with rules and procedures as a central contributing factor to workplace accidents.  This 
underlines the importance of identifying the organizational factors that affect the level of 
safety compliant behavior.  The purpose of the present study was to examine how 
workers’ perception of leadership involvement in daily work operations affects the level 
of safety compliant behavior among workers” (Dahl & Olsen, 2013, p.17).  Safety 
behavior is comprised of participation and compliance, where compliance is mandatory 
and participation is not.  In this study, Dahl and Olsen (2013), hypothesized that worker 
compliance would increase with leadership involvement.  Greater than 10,000 Norwegian 
petroleum employees participated in the longitudinal study, conducted by anonymous 
questionnaires.  The results of the study showed previous research, which identified that 
leaders who emphasize the importance of safety realize greater safety performance.  One 
of the limitations presented in this study is that the questionnaire did not take into account 
the different hierarchical levels of leaders in their analysis.  Dahl and Olsen’s study 
(2013) has an identified limitation that the proposed research will fill; assessing 
leadership engagement at various organizational levels.  This research also indicated the 
need for safety management to be researched with general management techniques.   
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Biggs, Banks, Davey, and Freeman (2013) involved qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of safety leaders in the Australian construction industry.  The leaders, which 
ranged from executive leaders to front line managers to safety professionals provided 
insight on safety culture and barriers to implementation of safety culture.  The study 
showed that leaders identified leadership and visibility as the primary, effective means to 
implementing a positive safety culture.  This article provides the definition of safety 
culture and barriers of safety culture from only one side of the organization; the 
management side of the organization.  
Zohar and Polachek (2014), investigated the effect of communications from the 
front line manager on the safety culture and resulting safety performance of shop floor 
employees.  In the control group, no feedback was provided to front line managers, but 
feedback was obtained from direct reports.  In the experimental group, two feedback 
sessions were provided to managers on how to improve safety culture through 
communication.  Ultimately, the experimental group experienced improvements to safety 
behavior and culture, teamwork and safety performance.  This research continues to build 
on some of Zohar’s seminal articles on safety culture from the 1980s.   
Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, and Mbaye, (2015) focused on the first line managers and 
their perceptions of risk in the job, level of involvement in safety and perceived safety 
climate.  The research of first line managers (66) in France indicated that the greater the 
perceived risk, the more involved the manager became.  Additionally, the greater the 
perception of safety culture, the greater the involvement of the manager is safety.  Unlike 
some seminal research in this area (namely, Zohar), the study did not show significant 
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effects on safety culture due to the attitude of upper management.  This results of this 
study, therefore, supports the proposed research as it provides a conflict with previous 
research.  This article also showed a similar study across different types of organizations.   
The greater the perception of safety culture, the greater the involvement of the 
manager is safety.  This is important to highlight as employee’s positive perceptions of 
safety culture impact reductions in injuries.  Management commitment to safety was 
found to have the greatest impact on employee’s perceptions (O’Toole, 2002).   
Zohar and Polachek (2014), investigated the effect of communications from the 
front line manager on the safety culture and resulting safety performance of shop floor 
employees.  When there was communication from the front line manager to the shop 
floor employees, the results found improvements to safety behavior and culture, 
teamwork and safety performance (Zohar & Polachek, 2014).   
Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006), found that positive exchanges 
between employees and supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors, impacting safety 
performance.  This occurs because those with high quality relationships feel as though 
they can express concerns with workplace safety, resulting in fewer accidents (Michael, 
Guo, Wiedenbeck, & Ray, 2006).   
Kapp (2012) found that the relationship between the front line employee and their 
direct supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance (Kapp, 2012).  
Supervisors who place greater value on safety experience greater compliance, while those 
who place lower value on safety experience lower levels of compliance.   
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Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson, and Denyer (2016), found that the relationship 
between the front line supervisor and his/her direct reports have been studied while other 
leadership relationships (such as senior managers) that set the tone for safety culture 
within their organizations are in need of investigation.   
Implications of previous research on the proposed research study 
With the intent of eliminating bias, as Flin (2003) found that senior leaders are 
more likely to share what they believe are the safety related responses of a senior leader; 
rather than their actual beliefs, the proposed study will review the attitude and 
commitment of the senior leader through their interactions with their organization’s 
safety professional. 
My study used the theoretical and practical implications developed through Zohar 
and Polachek (2014) and the keyword “organizational climate theory” for the research.  
The research also incorporated the findings of Pilbeam et al. (2016), associated with the 
relationship between the front line supervisor and his/her direct reports.  Pilbeam et al. 
(2016) found that the relationship between the front line supervisor and direct reports 
have been studied, while other leadership relationships (such as senior managers) that set 
the tone for safety culture within their organizations are in need of investigation, which is 
the intent of the proposed research. 
Olle-Espluga et al., (2014), identified that little research has been conducted to 
analyze the relationship between safety representatives and the shop floor employees.  
This relationship is an important factor that must be considered as part of the proposed 
research; could the existence of and influence of a safety representative compensate for a 
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less than ideal commitment of a manager to a positive safety culture?  In this study, nine 
out of ten safety representatives believed that management attitudes toward safety failed 
to foster a culture of safety by an unwillingness to invest in safety if not regulatory 
required (Olle-Espluga et al., 2014).  Additionally, this article helps to support my 
research and the direction of interviewing safety professionals.  The article indicated the 
unique perspective of safety professionals (or the slightly different “safety representative” 
role, identified in this article).  The findings of this research showed that management 
attitudes drive safety climate. 
Conchie, Moon, and Duncan (2013) found that the factors leading to the safety 
leadership of a supervisor are under researched.  When considering leadership styles and 
the impact on organizational culture and the reduction of occupational injuries, this 
research will address the Conchie et al. (2013) proposal for additional research by 
considering the impact of trust, from other members of the organizations, on 
organizational culture.  
Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, and Kirwan (2013) identified the need for future studies to 
compare the perceptions of safety culture across different industries and within different 
levels of organizations as well as safety performance data.  Fruhen, Mearns, Flin and 
Firwan (2014), suggests analyzing the views of other employees in the organizational 
hierarchy to include managers closer to shop floor employees so that “the workforce can 
help identify whether senior managers’ personal characteristics differ in their influence 
on safety at different organizational levels” (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2014, 
p.18).  Additionally, the proposed study will address a limitation of the Michael, Guo, 
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Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006) study, by collecting information from the perspective of the 
safety professional; not the supervisor or shop floor employees measuring themselves. 
The research conducted by Lee, Idris, and Delfabbro (2016) did not confirm the 
results of Hill et al. (2012).  Lee et al (2016), found that while empowering leadership 
increased work engagement the research did not indicate that engagement was reduced in 
the presence of a strict hierarchical culture.  Due to the conflicting results observed in the 
Lee et al. (2016) and Hill et al. (2012), studies, the proposed research will evaluate the 
effect of hierarchical culture on safety culture and safety performance (and how that 
culture is translated to behaviors at various hierarchical levels of the organization).   
In alignment with the recommendations of Sheehan, Donohue, Shea, Cooper, and 
De Cieri (2016), the data to be used in the proposed research will be collected from 
across the United States, representing many different types of organizations (private and 
public, high and low hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, 
healthcare, etc.) and across multiple organizations and those which do not represent only 
blue collar jobs.   
Research Methods 
My research examined the perception of the effect of executives, front line 
managers and all middle management on creating a positive safety culture.  Qualitative 
research is in alignment with Antonsen (2009), which confirms previous research 
suggesting that qualitative analysis of a safety culture may be more appropriate than 
quantitative analysis.  Additionally, this research indicated that organizations struggle 
with ensuring that the safety culture of the executive leadership team is conveyed to shop 
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for employees through their front line supervisor (Antonsen, 2009).  To understand the 
perception of culture at various hierarchical levels of the organization, safety 
professionals at various organizations will be consulted for interview. 
The data was collected in the form of interviews from across the United States, 
representing many different types of organizations (private and public, high and low 
hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.), to fill a 
research gap indicated by Fruhen, Mearns, Flin and Kirwan (2013).   
Nielsen (2014) acknowledges that a theoretical framework for safety culture is not 
fully developed and there is a lack of studies on cultural change.  Globally, literature 
revealed that the creation of health and safety committees did not indicate a reduction in 
injuries, but that a reduction was based on the activities completed by, the structuring and 
size of the health and safety committee (Nielsen, 2014).  This study showed the effect of 
the health and safety committees on improving safety culture.  This article supported my 
research by explaining that the structure and focus of a safety committee (which 
determines its effect on injury reduction) is set by the management team and their 
commitment to safety.  This study also indicated examples of how to measure safety 
culture in qualitative research.  
World class occupational safety and health (OSH) is typically identified by 
organizations with: 
1)OSH on par with business performance; 2) system based approach to OSH; 3) 
continuous improvement; 4) OSH aligned with organization strategies and values; 
and 5) promoting safety and health on and off the job. (Saujani, 2016, p.37)   
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This is in conjunction with five qualities including (1) visible leadership of the 
management team, (2) employee engagement, (3) operationalization of safety into the 
business, (4) root cause analysis and data driven decision making, (5) implementing 
health and safety requirements beyond mere compliance with regulatory requirements.  In 
this case study, lessons learned from working with a large, multi location printing 
corporation with world class safety culture are shared.  This article consisted of 
significant literature review, to include definitions of world class safety culture and 
qualities of high performing companies but provided less description of the interviews 
conducted as part of the case study, to determine that the printing corporation met all of 
the definitions of a world class safety culture.  Information on what must be in place to 
have a world class safety culture is very important to the proposed research.  This study 
influenced my research as another resource that defines what it means to have a positive 
safety culture.  This information was utilized as part of the coding process; after 
completing interviews.  
Safety performance 
Reader, Noort, Sharrock, and Kirwan (2015) studied the effects of safety culture 
as it crosses national borders.  Specifically, the study indicated how national culture 
affected safety behaviors such as identifying and reporting safety hazards.  As part of the 
study, Reader, et al., (2015) identified that Danish employees were involved in four times 
the injuries when compared to their Swedish counterparts.  Similarly, the study showed 
that seafarers in three Asian countries differed in their safety culture, based on their 
national culture.  Rather than focusing on which national culture produces safer 
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organizations, future studies should focus on how national culture affects safety culture.  
This information can then be utilized by safety professionals to understand the style of 
safety program that must be employed to be effective within different national cultures.  
Similar to all other aspects of international management, safety management is also 
affected by cultural differences as norms, values and history shape the behaviors of 
employees.  More specifically, in high risk industries, safety management becomes an 
international concern as the high risk tasks cross national boundaries.  Rather than 
suggesting that some cultures are less safety conscious, the article focused on 
understanding the importance of safety within a culture and developing programs 
specifically oriented toward what is most effective at engaging that culture in 
occupational safety.  My research referenced this article to discuss how culture impacts 
safety performance.  Again, while it is not to say that some cultures do not value safety, it 
is to indicate that it is necessary to understand what motivates or what type of programs 
are most successful with a given culture. 
Han, Saba, Lee, Mohamed, and Pena-Mora (2014) have identified that it is 
necessary to systematically approach safety.  This means that the effect on safety 
performance must be compared to production pressures (Han, Saba, Lee, Mohamed, & 
Pena-Mora, 2014).  After collecting data, the authors developed a simulated case study.  
The results identified that scheduling delays and rework had the greatest impact on safety 
performance (Han et al., 2014).  Thus, it is most important that management pay attention 
to the perceptions of employees that leads them to believe that scheduling delays 
necessitate rushed performance of tasks (which lead to safety incidents).  As part of my 
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research, it was expected that perceptions of “shop floor” employees and the direct 
managers of “shop floor” employees were key.  My research hypothesized that these 
perceptions will surround what individuals believe the executive level manager really 
wants.  For example, when shop floor employees hear that safety is key, but we need to 
make production today, they may develop the perception that it is acceptable to take 
shortcuts, as long as no one is injured.  In reality, the perception may be skewed, as the 
message because skewed as it traveled from the executive to the shop floor employee.  
My research needed to be careful to capture and understand the perceptions present at 
each level of employees within the organization. 
Sweden and Denmark have similar cultural similarities.  This includes gender 
equality, collectivism, participatory and team based leadership styles.  However, their 
rates of industry in construction are significantly different, leading to a need to explore 
the differences in safety culture that contribute to the difference in occupational injury 
rates.  Denmark experiences an occupational fatality rate 33% higher than the rate in 
Sweden (Grill et al., 2015).  The research was conducted as a qualitative case study, with 
nine participants, a mixture of Swedish and Danish participant, with ranges in age 
including both sexes a range of professional roles and a range of construction worker 
rolls.  The first theme that emerged was participatory management, where management 
would seek input and work together to make decisions with all employees (Grill et al., 
2015).  This allowed for more rapid addressing of safety issues or concerns.  This is not 
the case in Denmark.  In addition, participatory management styles are regulated in 
Sweden, further driving the culture in that direction (Grill et al., 2015).  Directive 
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management also indicated the difference between the two countries.  For example, the 
Danish employees indicated that directive management was utilized to communicate 
safety.  However, the culture was that once the manager who explained the rules had left, 
the employees were left to do as they see fit (Grill et al., 2015).  This style of leadership 
left no room for input from employees on a better or a safer way to perform work.  One 
example provided by a Danish participant explained that if the manager provided 
direction to obtain a ladder, the employee would do just that, rather than identifying that 
the job could be completed safer and faster by using a lift (Grill et al., 2015).  This is an 
important distinction in how management styles foster safety culture, and will be 
valuable research to add to my study.  The proposed study will utilize this research to 
help develop interview questions.  Since the questions in this study related to the culture 
of the organization, the questions will be useful.  Data to support this study was obtained  
from safety professionals, which further justifies the decisions of proposed research to 
interview safety professionals to help identify the safety culture at different hierarchical 
levels of an organization. 
The role of national culture in determining safety culture 
Power, Klassen, Kull, and Simpson, (2015) evaluated the effects of national 
culture in management decisions to invest in safety and the environment.  The results 
indicate that larger plants are more likely to invest in safety and the environment.  It is 
also more likely that international firms (with more complex operations) are more likely 
to invest due to their resources and access to and understanding of industry best practices.  
A surprising result of the study was that facilities with more engineers did not invest 
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more in safety and the environment.  This is surprising, based on the fact that it may be 
expected that more engineers would result in more recognition for safety and 
environmental improvement needs.  The study showed that the importance that the senior 
manager places on safety and the environment impacted the amount of resources spent on 
safety and environmental investments.  The authors speculate about why it is possible 
that facilities with a larger number of engineers invest less in safety and environmental 
improvements.  There are no supporting citations to backup these alternatives.   
Ahmed and Waqas (2017) conducted research in Pakistan, regarding injuries, 
safety culture and employee turnover.  The quantitative study was conducted by 
surveying 111 employees.  The intent was to review whether injury rate increased 
employee intent to leave a job.  Safety culture and employee intent to leave a job were 
also evaluated.  It was determined that injury rate impacts employee intent to leave a job.  
However, safety culture was not found to impact employee intent to leave a job.  This is 
likely attributed to the poverty, unemployment and lack of job security in factory and 
construction work.  This research showed reason to question whether job insecurity or 
income level will have an impact on the development of safety culture.  The article also 
cited an instrument of safety culture that was reviewed as part of my research; an 
instrument created by Frazier in 2013.  
Defining safety culture 
Fedorychev and Hammer (2015), indicate that the most important aspect of 
improving safety culture is identifying the current state of the safety culture.  Thus, the 
outcome of the study proposed the use of different types of analysis to qualify an 
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organization’s safety culture.  For example, the recommendation is to utilize scale 
questionnaires to help to “represent identifiable and recognizable characteristics of safety 
culture” (Fedorychev & Hammer, 2015, p.756).   
Fedorycheva and Hammer (2015), indicate that the most important aspect of 
improving safety culture is identifying the current state of the safety culture.  Thus, the 
results of the study indicated a need for the use of different types of analysis to qualify an 
organization’s safety culture.  For example, the recommendation is to utilize scale 
questionnaires. 
Specific incident investigations, related to safety culture 
Bing, Zhengdong, Yao, Yan, and Zhenjiang (2014), identified that in China, the 
fatalities in mining (per million tons) is ten times the United States’ rate.  This is typically 
considered to be the result of improper management; a reactive rather than proactive 
approach to safety, insufficient safety funding and a lack of safety training.  A SWOT 
analysis was utilized to determine how to implement a safety management system.  The 
result is a proposal starts with executive leadership explaining the objective and 
commitment to safety.  Then, roles and responsibilities must be explained for each 
position in the organization.  Identify hazards as well as applicable laws and procedures 
governing the hazards, train on the hazards and controls as well as the importance of the 
management system; this will help build the safety culture which the management team 
must foster.  Finally, generate a system to observe, adjust and continuously improve the 




Change is employed in order to give the employer a competitive advantage, but it 
means stress and worry to an employee (Bordia, Restubog, Jimmieson, & Irmer, 2011).  
While past research has been focused on instances of change, it has not focused on how 
historical changes within the organization impact the attitude and behavior of employees.  
This Bordia et al., research was conducted to fill this gap.  One of the hypotheses of the 
study was that a poor change management history is inversely related organizational 
trust.  A similar hypothesis states that as a poor history of change management increases, 
so will cynicism.  Finally, those likely to be cynical to change a less open to change.  In 
order to test the hypothesis, several different studies were conducted.  In the first, 155 
employees were surveyed two months after the organization had announced a merger 
with another company.  All employees had previously experienced a history of poor 
change management.  In the second, an educational institution was surveyed, where 
previous poor change management had occurred.  Nearly 125 employees responded at 
two points; within 3 months of the change implemented and two years post change.  
These studies failed to disprove the null hypothesis.  The authors recommend that the 
aspects of the study that were self reported are modified to decrease bias.  Future studies 
should also focus on an understanding of poor change management history.  This study 
should be used by leaders to understand that past experience with change management 
can predict attitude, behavior, engagement, satisfaction and turnover.  All of these 
elements (attitude, behavior, engagement, satisfaction and turnover) are also related to 




The study conducted by Kark, Katz-Navon, and Delegach, (2015) described two 
types of employee safety behavior; voluntary proactive behaviors and mandatory 
compliance behaviors.  The voluntary behaviors are often driven by leadership styles, 
which result in employees working to improve conditions and practices and a reduced 
rate of injury.  Kark et al. conducted a study based on the recommendations for future 
studies of the Clark (2013) study; identifying the mechanisms that make transactional and 
transformational leadership successful.  The study showed that "when the leader is 
perceived as transformational, he or she is able to enhance a variety of behaviors 
contributing to organizational safety including those of compliance" (p.1343).  The 
results of this study indicated that training at a supervisory level is needed.  With this 
education, supervisors are better able to apply the techniques of transformational and 
transactional leadership in order to achieve the benefits of safety performance and 
compliance as well as employees who are proactive in improving the safety environment. 
Safety and economics 
The Lebeau, Duguay, and Boucher (2014) evaluated the cost of injuries in Quebec 
between the years of 2005 and 2007.  Included in the evaluation was considerations for 
the suffering of the employee and the lost productivity of the employer.  On an annual 
basis, the study showed that employers lose 1.78 billion and employees suffer 2.84 billion 
in losses, with the average loss around $40,000 per case.  It is difficult and imprecise to 
calculate doses, as assumptions are made that change across generations, genders and 
family status.  However, despite limitations, studies like this show the costs (likely 
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underestimated) of occupational juries with the intent of highlighting the appropriate path 
for research and injury prevention.  
Data on the cost of fatalities is available, while the costs of serious injuries and 
the lifelong impact of disability is under researched.  It is for this reason that Marucci-
Wellman et al., (2015) studied the occurrence of serious occupational injuries from 1998-
2010 in the United States.  The study showed that direct costs of these injuries was $600 
billion, though while the number of cases reduced year over year, the costs did not.  The 
current study did not indicate if this is due to more severe injuries, an aging workforce or 
more costly treatment.  
As Serrier, Sultan-Taieb, Luce, and Bejean (2014), indicated, occupational safety 
has "an impact on economic growth by affecting the labor supply, in particular through 
the number of working days lost because of illness or accident and the reduced 
productivity of employees at work" (p.661).  The focus of the study was on the cost of 
occupational lung cancer; more specifically, the cost by risk factor.  While 2008 results 
indicate that a case of occupational lung cancer costs approximately 62 million Euros, but 
the results of this study helped to break down direct (medical bills) and indirect costs 
(loss of productivity due to decreased morale grieving for co workers) cost by hazard.  
Approximately 60-70% of occupational lung cancer is associated with asbestos exposure, 
costing approximately 500,000 to 1.5 million Euros.  The purpose of this study is 
prevention.   
Cancer is a disease that is still difficult to treat and that can have physical as well 
as psychological repercussions.  The occupational risk factors are generally 
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‘‘avoidable’’ with technically feasible preventive measures being available, 
whose implementation, however, depends on decisions made by individuals not 
directly affected by these risks.  In the particular context of occupational cancers, 
it is ultimately more effective to prevent a cancer than to treat it. (Serrier, Sultan-
Taieb, Luce and Bejean, 2014, p.671) 
Research has showed that it makes good financial sense to invest in injury 
prevention (Fabius, Thayer, Konicki, Yarborough, Peterson, Isaac, & Dreger, 2013).  
Previous research has shown that for every dollar spent when an employee used 
healthcare, an additional $2.13 was lost by the company.  Thus, the authors hypothesized 
that promoting a safe, healthy and wellness conscious working population would result in 
improved productivity, increased profit and better stock performance.  To test the 
hypothesis, data from more than 10 years of CHAA award winners was reviewed.  The 
results showed that there is a correlation between organizations that promote wellness 
and reduce health and safety risks outperform the market.  
Summary and Conclusions 
Each year United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than 
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly 5 million more (Hofmann et al., 2017).  
These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the economy as 
nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (Marucci-Wellman et al., 
2015).  The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88% of occupational 
incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and beliefs toward 
safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive safety culture 
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(Zhang et al., 2018).  In the example of the Deepwater Horizon incident, an oil rig fire 
killed 11, injured 16 and cost $34 billion in medical claims and legal settlements (Reader 
& O’Connor, 2014).  This event demonstrates the association between leadership 
acceptance of unsafe behaviors, unrealistic production expectations and the occurrence of 
serious occupational incidents (Oudhuis & Tengblad, 2018).  If safety is perceived as a 
value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind, 
reducing injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005).  This is especially important when considering 
that management is responsible for addressing conflicts between strategic goals such as 
safety and production (Engemann & Scott, 2018).   
 The specific management problem is that executives use dynamic or on the fly 
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’ 
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety 
behaviors and work related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).  In the example of the 
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, employees were rewarded for cost cutting measures and 
on time production delivery, not for safety performance (Smith, 2011).  Bronkhorst et al. 
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to 
improve safety culture. 
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe 
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within 
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive interventions, the words and actions or voice, of executives 
may allow for the development of training.  The training could encourage executives to 
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practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death 
and injury.  Safety professionals were asked to describe the interventions that have been 
employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of 
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe 
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within 
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive interventions; the words and actions or voice, of executives 
may allow for the development of training.  The training could encourage executives to 
practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death 
and injury.  Safety professionals were asked to describe the interventions that have been 
employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of 
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization.  The intent was to 
capture the lived experience of the safety professionals, as suggested by Giorgi (2009). 
This chapter will include a description of research design and rationale, the role of 
the researcher, methodology, participant selection, and instrumentation.  This chapter will 
then introduce procedures for participant selection, data analysis plan, issues of 
trustworthiness, ethical procedures, possible types of data sources and possible analytical 
strategies. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The purpose of this qualitative, descriptive phenomenological research study was 
to describe the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety 
culture within their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  The central 
research question was: 
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RQ:  What are the lived experience of safety professionals observing the 
development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the interventions of 
executives? 
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological study was to describe how 
executives effectively influence the safety culture within their organizations, as perceived 
by safety professionals.  Qualitative research is in alignment with Antonsen (2009), who 
confirmed previous research suggesting that qualitative analysis of a safety culture may 
be more appropriate than quantitative analysis.  To understand the perception of cultural 
interventions at executive levels of organizations, I interviewed safety professionals at 
various organizations.  I included Safety professionals as part of the research to address 
recommendations highlighted by previous research indicating that executives may, when 
questioned, respond in a manner which indicates that they exhibit the expected level of 
safety engagement, as indicated by Flin (2003).  The safety professional has unique 
access to executive level employees, shop floor employees and all management levels in 
between and has training, experience, and education to understand safety culture and 
implications.  Based on their experiences, the safety professional is uniquely positioned 
to describe their perception of effectiveness of leader interventions on the safety culture 
of the organization.  This is also in alignment with Schein (1990) who expressed the 
struggle to decipher artifacts of culture without an insider’s perspective.  In my study, the 
safety professional was the insider. 
The participants in my study were asked to participate in interviews.  The 
interviews consisted of open-ended questions designed to elicit the safety professional’s 
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perception of the effectiveness of interventions employed by executive levels of 
management on improving the safety culture throughout the organization that they 
represent.  The names of the organizations that the safety professional participants 
represent remained anonymous; as this information was not collected and was redacted 
from the transcript if unintentionally provided by the participant. 
The use of the phenomenological research method in my study is similar to other 
phenomenological research conducted to understand the feelings and experiences of 
others, within the realm of occupational health and safety.  Høivik et al. (2009) conducted 
a phenomenological study on the phenomenon of safety culture to produce a description 
of safety culture at one facility.  Chikudate (2009) conducted a phenomenological study 
to describe the experiences of Japanese train companies and post incident learnings.  
Burgoyne and Hodgson (1983) conducted phenomenological research on learnings of 
management based on their experiences in the workplace.  Catlette (2005) conducted a 
phenomenological study on the lived experience of workplace violence survivors, 
including their fears, actions within the workplace and recommended safety 
improvements. 
Role of the Researcher 
As the researcher, I was an observer of the research.   I have a relationship with 
the professional organization that I utilized to recruit research participants.  While I had 
met professionally with some individuals who ultimately participated in the study, these 
meetings have strictly been regarding discussions on how to improve the management of 
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our safety programs.  I do not hold an elected position within the organization and 
therefore do not believe that the perception of influence existed. 
Throughout the research, I made conscious efforts to eliminate my own, personal 
bias.  I have served as a safety professional for more than 12 years.  Throughout my 
professional career, I have seen leaders and executives who exhibited high levels of 
safety commitment and low levels of safety commitment.  I have seen the results of 
leaders actions develop into positive and negative safety cultures.  I have seen serious 
injuries occur because of unsafe behaviors that were accepted or even praised when they 
facilitated on-time project delivery.  Due to my experience, I exercised caution and 
understood my potential for bias, ensuring that it did not interfere with the collection of 
data and completion of research.  One of the ways in which I worked to eliminate bias 
was through the data collection process.  For example, I structured interview questions so 
that all interviewees were asked the same questions.  I asked additional questions to get to 
the appropriate level of detailed response from participants.  I recorded every interview 
and transcribed every interview so that no words were lost in interpretation.  I had also 
completed a course on interviewing techniques and how to interpret and respond to body 
language exhibited by interviewees. 
Methodology 
Several researchers have suggested that qualitative research is the most 
appropriate method to evaluate safety culture.  Antonsen (2009) confirmed previous 
research suggesting that qualitative analysis of a safety culture may be more appropriate 
than quantitative analysis.  A limitation of the Bronkhorst et al. (2018) study indicated 
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that there was no qualitative data collected on the interventions to understand the why 
and the how of the effectiveness of the leaders’ intervention.  Qualitative methods were 
incorporated into my research in order to identify the interventions employed by 
organizational executives and the impact on safety culture. 
I combined purposeful sampling with the snowball method for identifying study 
participants.  I selected purposeful sampling in order to ensure the most efficient 
collection of rich data for analysis, by selecting participants who are most familiar with 
the phenomenon of the study.  Purposeful sampling was also most appropriate because 
this method helped to ensure the:  
availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to communicate 
experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner. In 
contrast, probabilistic or random sampling is used to ensure the generalizability of 
findings by minimizing the potential for bias in selection and to control for the 
potential influence of known and unknown confounders. (Palinkas, et al., 2015, 
p.2),   
as indicated by Palinkas et al. (2015).  To align with the purpose of this research, 
purposeful sampling had been selected. 
I utilized purposeful sampling to identify individuals who had education in the 
field of occupational safety/engineering with at least 5 years of experience (2 of which 
must be with current employer).  As needed, I utilized the snowballing technique to 
gather additional participants meeting these criteria. 
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Participant Selection Logic 
I recruited participants from a local chapter of a professional safety organization.  
These individuals had roles and responsibilities for their employer that supported 
occupational safety in the workplace.  This ensured that they had current experience in 
the safety profession.  Additionally, participants had a bachelor’s (or higher) degree in 
safety science or an engineering field.  This ensured that there was a standard for formal 
education among respondents.  Participants had 5 years of experience in a safety role and 
at least 2 years with their current employer.  This requirement was to ensure that the 
safety professional had the experience to evaluate the safety culture as it exists within 
their organization and has had time to observe executives within the organization and the 
actions that they take in order to impact the safety culture of their organization.  As part 
of the study, a participant could not discuss the safety culture of a previous employer, as 
it is possible that their employment status could impact their perception of the safety 
culture of that organization.  A review of the resume, LinkedIn profile, or confirmation of 
the participant was required in order to confirm degree achievement and length of 
employment. 
Approximately 20 participants were identified to participate in my study.  I 
identified these participants by first contacting the entire distribution of a Lehigh Valley 
professional safety organization through their email distribution list.  Members who 
responded to the initial email I sent were contacted by email with additional information 
on the nature and purpose of the study as expected time commitment, confidentiality, and 
their ability to stop their participation at any time.  As I was not able to identify a 
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sufficient number of participants, the process was to be additionally conducted with the 
Philadelphia Chapter of the same professional safety organization. 
Saturation is an important part of the methodology of research.  Without 
saturation, it is not likely to meet quality standards for qualitative research (Saunders, et 
al., 2018).  Saturation occurs when no additional data is being obtained that is 
contributing to the expansion of the theory (Saunders, et al., 2018).  This is the point 
where data collection ends and data analysis begins.  The management program at 
Walden states that sample size for phenomenological research is 20.  Thus, the intended 
sample size for my research was to be 20; unless saturation was reached first.  Selecting a 
sample size of 20 is aligned with past research.  Research conducted by Mason (2010) 
reviewed approximately 25 phenomenological studies.  Of those studies, while the 
highest recorded number of participants was 89, and the lowest was seven, the mean and 
mode were 20 (Mason, 2010). 
In order to ensure that a sample size of 20 was appropriate, I reviewed 
phenomenological studies associated with culture and safety.  In general, these studies 
demonstrated that 20 participants were an appropriate minimum to establish (unless 
saturation has been met, first).   
I reviewed the following studies: 
 Currie and Richens (2009) conducted a phenomenological study utilizing 
33 individuals associated with culture of safety in midwifery 
 Høivik, Moen, Mearns, & Haukelid (2009) conducted a phenomenological 
study utilizing 31 individuals performing work in Norwegian 
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manufacturing facilities in an assessment of environmental, health and 
safety culture 
 Siemsen, Madsen, Pedersen, Michaelsen, Pedersen, Andersen, and 
Østergaard (2012) conducted a phenomenological study utilizing 47 
individuals focusing on the culture of patient safety 
 Brown, Middleton, Fereday, and Pincombe (2016) conducted a 
phenomenological study utilizing 13 individuals to study cultural safety 
for aboriginal women 
 Crowther and Smythe (2016) conducted a phenomenological study 
utilizing 13 individuals to study safety for maternity in rural areas 
 Glenn, Stocker‐Schnieder, McCune, McClelland and King (2014) 
conducted a phenomenological study utilizing 13 individuals to study 
patient safety 
While not all of the research reviewed focused specifically on a 
phenomenological study associated with occupational safety culture development, each 
focused on aspects of culture and safety in the workplace or community and I  
determined the sample size to be comparable to the minimum number of participants 
required in a safety culture phenomenological research in order to reach data saturation. 
Instrumentation 
For my qualitative research, interviews were conducted in order to generate an 
understanding of the lived experience of the participants.  The interviews were 
semistructured, in order to ensure consistency between the interviews.  The interview was 
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semistructured in order to allow me to delve into the responses of the participants and ask 
clarifying questions.  I derived the semistructured interview questions from the tool 
developed by Frazier, Ludwig, Whitaker, and Roberts (2013).  Frazier et al. (2013) 
conducted research on the assessment of safety culture of more than 25,000 individuals.  
The results of the study were the identification of four primary impacts to safety culture: 
the concern of management, personal responsibility, peer interactions with regards to 
safety, and the management system associated with safety.  I modified the questions 
developed by Frazier et al. (2013) in order to identify not that these areas impact safety 
culture but how executives can effectively influence safety culture in these categories.   
Additionally, I incorporated questions to assess the safety culture of an 
organization (those focused specifically on management actions) from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in order to identify the actions of management that 
contributed most to improved safety culture.  These questions are used by the NRC at 
facilities following a serious safety or environmental incident to investigate the incident 
(Reiman, 2004).  A subset of the investigation of the incident is an investigation of the 
occupational safety and environmental culture of the organization. 
I incorporated these questions by comparing the response of participants to 
determine which is the action that is successful most often in practice.  In addition to 
general questions about the organization, the questions included the following questions, 
derived from previously developed questionnaires: 
o How would you describe your interactions with executives and the 
interactions of shop floor employees as it relates to the safety culture? 
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o How would you describe the safety culture of the shop floor employees? 
o Does management’s decisions regarding operational issues (such as 
changes to the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the 
appropriate focus on safety?  If so, please give examples. Does 
management’s decisions regarding operational issues (such as changes to 
the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the appropriate 
focus on safety?  If so, please give examples. 
o Provide examples of situations in which there was a perception of 
management’s trade off/conflict between safety and production (e.g., there 
was pressure to meet a schedule goal, but you or someone you know 
identified a problem which would delay the work)?  Have you ever run 
into a situation like this?  If so, what did you do?  How did it work out?   
o How would you describe the safety culture of the highest ranking officials 
on the jobsite? 
o How would you describe the leadership style of the highest ranking 
official? 
o What actions have been taken by the highest ranking officials to 
effectively influence the safety culture at the jobsite and what where the 
effects of those actions? 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
First, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained.  This process 
began during the URR review process, when Form A (Description of Data Sources and 
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Partner Sites) was submitted to IRB.  This form submission resulted in guidance provided 
with regards to specific IRB submissions.  Working with the IRB, the intent was to have 
IRB approval shortly after proposal approval by URR.  Recruitment occurred after 
approval from IRB. 
Following IRB approval, the informed consent process was followed.  This 
ensured that participants were fully educated on the process of the study before 
participating.  For my research, potential participants received initial communication on 
the research via email.  Participants then had the ability to call, text or email any 
questions that they had regarding the study and their potential participation.  After the 
participants had been fully informed of the details of the study and their ability to remove 
themselves from the study at any time, the informed consent of the participant was 
obtained via signature or other electronic confirmation and retained. 
The document utilized to document informed consent originated from Walden’s 
sample consent form for adults.  I modified this form to reflect the details of my research 
and any relevant data.  For example, information was included on the description of the 
study, inclusion criteria for participants, the purpose of the study, study procedures 
(including the potential time commitment of the participants), sample of interview 
questions, reminder of the voluntary nature of the study, privacy, risks, contact 
information of the researcher for question and obtaining consent. 
After that time, recruitment began through a local safety professional 
organization.  I am a member of the national organization, as well as the Philadelphia and 
Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania chapters.  Approximately 20 participants were identified.  
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These participants were identified by first contacting the entire distribution of the Lehigh 
Valley Chapter of a professional safety organization through their email distribution list.  
Members who respond to the initial email were contacted by email with additional 
information on the nature and purpose of the study as expected time commitment, 
confidentiality and their ability to stop their participation at any time.  As enough 
participants were not identified, I attempted to continue the process with the Philadelphia 
Chapter of the same professional safety organization.  Each chapter had a large number 
of members.  In the city of Philadelphia alone, there were at least 70 members who would 
have qualified to participate in the study. 
Again, when the participants were identified, I obtained consent of the 
participants, ensuring that they understood that they could withdraw their participation at 
any time.  Additionally, participants were informed that their participation is for research 
only, all information that could point to a person or an organization would be kept strictly 
confidential and the records will be kept only for the minimum length of time required by 
the University; five years following completion of the dissertation. 
Sampling would be completed after data saturation was reached, which was 
expected to be ~20 participants.  The first volunteers meeting the criteria were 
interviewed; either in person or via a video chat application.  I preferred face-to-face or 
video chat as it allowed me to see the body language and facial expression of the 
interviewee in order to gather the full response of the interviewee.  For that reason, audio 
only or email responses (for initial discussion) were not intended to be accepted.  In order 
to complete a thorough discussion, it was expected that each interview would last 60-90 
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minutes.  Subsequent interviews and/or follow up phone or email communications would 
be requested to elaborate on response, if necessary. 
The participants were intended to be requested to meet in a community location 
that is convenient for them.  The intent was that the participant would meet the researcher 
at this time.  The data was collected by the researcher.  Each participant was intended to 
be asked to meet in person on one occasion.  It was expected that the series of questions 
would take approximately 60-90 minutes.  Participants were informed of the expected 
timeframe, in advance.   If any additional follow up was necessary, participants were 
asked if they may be contacted via phone or email, rather than face to face.  The 
participant was asked to confirm that it is acceptable to collect a digital recording of the 
interview.  When the participant accepted, the interview progressed.  Recording were 
completed digitally through an application.  The results of the interview were then 
transcribed.  At the conclusion of the study, a debrief was conducted with any interested 
participants.  They would be able to be provided with a copy of their transcript and will 
be able to learn of the results of the study once finalized. 
Data Analysis Plan 
The responses from the interviewees to the open ended interview questions were 
recorded, then transcribed, then reviewed for accuracy with the interviewee, if desired.  
Any misstatements or misrepresentations were corrected.  Specifically, the researcher 
utilized the transcription feature built in to Webex to record most interviews.  This 
transcription was reviewed by the researcher, and compared to the digital recording of the 
interview.  Any errors in transcription by the transcription service were documented.  
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Upon final review of the transcription, the participant was offered a copy of the 
transcribed interview.   
Once the data was confirmed to have been properly transcribed, it was analyzed.  
To do so, a chart was established, as has been the case by several other descriptive 
phenomenological research studies.  In this chart, the researcher placed the words utilized 
by the participant in one column and transformed in the second column to what the 
participant meant; as interpreted by the researcher both in words, actions and responses.  
The ultimate goal of the chart was to identify the meaning of the experience of the 
interviewee as it relates to the phenomena. 
The meaning of the experience of each participant was reviewed to determine 
trends in the information to ensure the research question was addressed, associated with 
the lived experience of safety professionals observing the development of safety culture 
in their organization, as impacted by the interventions of executives.  There was no 
software utilized to code the data; only hand coding was employed.  This allowed the 
experience of the researcher, who is also a safety professional, to understand and interpret 
the potential jargon utilized, similarities in the jargon used and interpret the meaning 
behind the examples provided by each participant. 
Coding was employed in order to describe trends in the data.  The transcript of the 
participant conversations was reviewed.  The spoken word, transcribed, was then 
compared to the emotions, non verbal cues and body language of the participant, as 




Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
In order to ensure reliability of data, all interviews were digitally recorded, with 
the permission of the interviewee.  The interview was then be fully transcribed by an 
transcription service.  The results of the transcription services were reviewed by the 
researcher for accuracy; as compared to the digitally recorded interview.  The interviewee 
was offered a copy of the transcript, if interested.  The purpose of the member checking 
of the transcript was to ensure that the statements from the participant were not 
misinterpreted.   
Additionally, interviews continued until data saturation was reached.  At a 
minimum, 20 interviews were intended to be conducted in alignment with the Walden 
management expectation for phenomenological research.  As stated previously, the mean 
number of interviews to reach data saturation has been observed to be approximately 20.  
Therefore, the intent was to conduct approximately 20 interviews until no new data was 
being presented, but only trends in data are being observed; as data saturation had been 
reached.   
Transferability 
A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study outside of the research 
population.  There will be generalities that apply; however, the study describes what was 
determined to be most effective safety interventions implemented by the leaders of the 
organizations represented by the research participants.  In order to determine applicability 
outside of the research participants, the context of the research is provided, in detail.  This 
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will allow readers to determine applicability outside of the research population and will 
also assist in ensuring dependability of the study. 
Dependability 
To ensure that the study can be replicated in the future, there will be good 
documentation of the semistructured  interview questions, of participant selection and 
qualifications. 
Confirmability 
The researcher built trust with the participants in order to ensure the most open 
and honest responses to interview questions.  This trust was built first by explaining the 
interview process.  This includes that consent of the participants will be obtained, 
ensuring that they understand that they may withdraw their participation at any time.  
Additionally, participants were informed that their participation is for research only, all 
information that could point to a person or an organization will be kept strictly 
confidential and the records will be kept only as long as required by the University; a 
minimum of 5 years following the completion of the dissertation.  All interviews were 
recorded, with the permission of the interviewee.  The interview was then fully 
transcribed.  The interviewee were offered a copy of the transcript, if interested.  This 
ensured that the statements from the participant are not misinterpreted. This additional 
step in the process was to ensure data reliability, but also to gain the trust of the 
participant; so that they understand the research is not attempting to manipulate their 
words, feelings or expressions in order to ensure that the results of the study align with 




This research followed all requirements of Walden’s IRB.  Research did not begin 
and participants were not recruited until IRB approval was provided for the research.  
First, Form A was submitted to IRB as the URR reviewed the proposal for the research.  
Once feedback on next steps were provided by IRB, the appropriate ethical concerns 
were fully addressed.  With approval of the proposal followed by IRB approval, 
Walden’s consent form, a copy included below, was modified for the proposed research 
and was used as part of the volunteer recruiting process.  This process ensured that 
participants were fully educated on the process of the study before participating.  For the 
research, participants received initial communication on the research via email.  
Participants then had the ability to call, text or email any questions that they had 
regarding the study and their participation.  After the participants had been fully informed 
of the details of the study and their ability to remove themselves from the study at any 
time, the informed consent of the participant was obtained via signature or by electronic 
means and retained.  With regards to risk to participants, the risk was not expected to be 
greater than any other normal life activity.  The research did not collect information 
intentionally from any sensitive populations and only collected information from those 
over the age of 21.  Data collected will remain secure and will only be maintained for the 
minimum time required by the University; 5 years beyond the completion of the 
dissertation.  Data security during that time will be ensured via a password protected 
document repository.  Participant names are not associated with data collected.  Any 
inadvertent mention of names of employees or organizations themselves were redacted 
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from the notes and transcripts from the interviews.  The data will only be accessible to 
myself and my dissertation committee.  Data will not be made available outside of the 
Walden University community.  
Summary 
The research was initiated by conducting interviews with individuals from the 
United States, representing many different types of organizations (private and public, 
high and low hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, 
etc.), to fill a research gap indicated by Fruhen et al. (2013).   
The data was collected in the form of individual interviews, which allowed the 
participant to describe the interventions employed by executive managers within the 
organization and their perceptions of those interventions. The interviews were conducted 
with safety professionals supporting the organization, as to provide a perspective from an 
individual who understands the importance of safety, how to identify concerns and how 
to correct hazards.  These safety professionals have worked with a facility for at least 2 
years, to ensure that they have had the ability to understand the safety culture of the 
organization.  To analyze the data, a system of coding needed to be developed.  The 
coding helped to identify trends and make general discoveries on the phenomena, which 
is safety culture.  I identified themes and deviations from themes.  The themes addressed 






Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was 
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their 
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive executive interventions; such as words, actions, or voice, 
may allow for improved development of training.  The training could encourage 
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces 
occupational death and injury.  I asked safety professionals to describe the interventions 
that have been employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the 
effectiveness of such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization.  
The intent was to capture the lived experience of the safety professionals, as identified by 
Giorgi (2009). 
The central research question was: What are the lived experiences of safety 
professionals observing the development of safety culture in their organization as 
impacted by the interventions of executives?    
In this chapter, I will address the research setting and demographics for the 
research.  I will also address data collection, data analysis, evidence of trustworthiness 
and the study results. 
Research Setting 
The IRB approval to complete this study as originally designed, was received in 
the first quarter of 2020.  This is approximately the time that COVID-19 began to impact 
the world.  Initially, the greatest impact remained in Asia before migrating to Europe.  In 
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the February timeframe, I was able to attend a single, local meeting of the safety 
professional organization and request participants from the approximately 12 attendees.  
Turnout was exceptionally low, likely due to winter weather, and the participants that 
attended the meeting and met the criteria outlined in the study were even lower. 
In mid-March 2020, the COVID-19 impact to the United States became so 
significant that schools began to shut down.  Workplaces mandated that nonessential 
employees to work from home.  Restaurants and public locations were shut down.  
Additionally, biosafety officers (those that run biological safety programs for companies) 
were on the forefront of protecting workplaces from COVID-19 outbreaks.  Typically, 
the biosafety officer is a role held by a safety professional, the key participant in this 
study.  The availability of participants, the closure of workplaces and public locations 
(such as restaurants, where the study interviews were intended to be collected), 
necessitated that I request changes to the study, that had previously been approved by the 
IRB. 
Therefore, the new proposal that was reviewed and approved included the ability 
to conduct electronic-based rather than face-to-face interviews with participants.  Due to 
the limited availability of safety professionals to participate in this study, the request also 
included the ability to request participants via electronic means, such as LinkedIn. 
Electronic recruiting via LinkedIn began in April and continued through July 
2020.  A post requesting participants was made on the American Society of Safety 
Professionals page as well as the Board of Certified Safety Professionals.  At the time of 
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the posting, I provided prospective participants with high-level details of the study as 
well as the informed consent document, containing my contact information. 
Demographics 
I proposed to use purposeful sampling as part of this research, to identify 
individuals who had education in the field of occupational safety/engineering with at least 
5 years of experience (2 of which must have been with the current employer), and the 
snowballing technique, if needed.  I intended to select the participants from members of a 
local safety professional organization but ultimately extended the invitation to qualifying 
participants through Board of Certified Safety Professionals (BCSP) membership, as 
well.  This change was exclusively due to the lack of availability of a sufficient number 
of local safety professionals, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  All individuals 
participating in the study were actively engaged in or had roles and responsibilities for 
their employer that support occupational safety in the workplace.  Participants had a 
bachelor’s (or higher) degree in safety science or an engineering field, as well as 5 years 
of experience in a safety role and at least 2 years with their current employer.  All 
participants worked within the United States, and primarily supported manufacturing 
operations.  Confirmation of meeting the conditions of the study were obtained by 
LinkedIn postings or verbal/written confirmation by the participant and all participant 
information remained confidential.  The participants were both male and female, with 




In total, I conducted the study with 15 participants; a number identified as 
saturation was reached.  More than 20 participants had expressed interest to participate, 
however, those that did not attend the interview at the agreed upon time or even respond 
to a proposed interview time were not involved in the study.   
The study was initially approved by the IRB to conduct in-person interviews by 
recruiting safety professionals from the Allentown and Philadelphia chapters of a local 
safety professional organization.  However, due to availability of local safety 
professionals associated with their involvement in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, 
recruiting of safety professionals occurred not only through the Allentown chapter, but 
nationally via LinkedIn.  In order to recruit via LinkedIn., the request for participants was 
posted to the national ASSP page on LinkedIn as well as the page for the Board of 
Certified Safety Professionals.  I provided all prospective participants with the informed 
consent form at the time of the posting, as well as personally via LinkedIn messaging 
services or via email. 
I intended for the study to be conducted through in-person interviews.  However, 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, public meeting locations, including the intended 
interview location, had been closed.  Therefore, I employed an electronic means of 
conducting and recording interviews.  I conducted the majority of interviews using 
WebEx and associated video.  However, due to the quality of some participant’s home 
internet (as many professionals were working from home), video was not always an 
option.  Additionally, some participants could only participate via the phone.  A few 
87 
 
individuals who were on the front-line of fighting the COVID-19 pandemic were 
involved in brief conversations followed by lengthy email responses; based on their 
availability. 
For interviews conducted via Webex, I recorded the Webex and generated a 
transcript.  For interviews conducted by phone, I recorded the interview and a transcript 
was typed based on the recordings.  For email conversations, I have retained the emails.  
Regardless of method of communication, all data were stored on a password protected 
laptop.  No print materials were collected. 
I intended for interview to take 30-60 minutes.  However, there was a significant 
range in the length of interviews, which was generally based on the level of detail 
provided by the interviewee as well as additional questions asked by the interviewee 
regarding the study and follow-up.  One interview lasted approximately 20 minutes, and 
several exceeded 1 hour (with the interviewee’s permission). 
I utilized open-ended questions in order to fully allow the participants to share 
their experiences and added additional, follow-up questions when checking for 
understanding was necessary or to expand upon the participants initial thought.  In some 
cases, participants answered multiple questions as they provided their response to the first 






I collected data from the interviews, which were then transcribed and hand-coding 
was employed.  I completed this task by compiling all transcripts into Microsoft Word 
and searching for common words and phrases among the participant responses.  I 
employed the theming of data, as indicated by Saldina (2015).  When common words and 
phrases were identified, I highlighted those words in a specific color.  The common 
words and phrases that I identified became associated with common themes and then the 
recommendations of Saldina (2015) were utilized to categorize the data “according to 
commonality and ordered in superordinate and subordinate outline format to reflect on 
their possible groupings and relationships” (Saldina, 2015, p. 178). 
Interview questions to safety professionals regarding their lived experience with 
executives and the development of safety culture resulted in data saturation and the 
emergence of the common themes (see Figure 1).  These themes addressed the research 
question:  What are the lived experiences of safety professionals observing the 
development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the interventions of 





Figure 1.  Common themes associated with executive impact 
 




An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership: “He always does safety first in 
his presentation.” 
Executives 
providing money to 
support safety 
initiative 
An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “Everybody's going home 
when it was too hot to work… everybody was 





An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “They definitely made more 
trips out to the plant, and they were based in 
Chicago so that was a big deal for the hourly 
employees to see, like oh, so, and so's coming out to 
visit us you know, we gotta clean up.” 
Executives care An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “They really do care and 









Obvious lack of 
engagement when 
safety isn’t a 
priority to 
executives 
An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “Like, we need production is 
more important. We need to get [product] out the 





An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “…safety being part of every 
conversation with leadership and integrating safety 
into the overall business.” 
Trust Not blaming 
employees 
An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “We want to improve this 
process, so this doesn't happen someone in the future 
and that resonated with this young person strongly. 
They were very forthcoming. They said, Here's 





An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “Because he's supported 
safety, I was able to bring on a health physicist. I 
was able to bring on a bio safety, human subject, 
testing expert. I was able to bring in a couple 
additional engineers. I probably tripled the staff.” 
Ownership Shop floor 
ownership of safety 
An example statement from a participant regarding 
executive leadership:  “And then if it worked, right, 
then there's a bottom up effect, and you, you start to 
develop culture and you have the basis for a good 
program.” 
 
Figure 2.  Themes surrounding development of safety culture 
 
 
There were outliers reported by participants that were not aligned with the common 
words, phrases and themes highlighted by the other participants.  These outliers 
originated from a participant who worked for a federal employer.  Federal employers are 
not required to comply with federal workplace regulations, such as OSHA.  Therefore, 
there is a significant difference between a federal employer choosing not to follow an 
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OSHA regulation and a private industry employer willfully outside of OSHA compliance.  
The implications to the safety culture would be significantly different.  For that reason, 
statements surrounding a choice not to follow regulations was omitted from the results of 
the study.  For this reason, further investigation into the culture of Federal employers and 
the development of culture would be interesting.  The following quotes support these 
statements:   
 They, they can choose to follow OSHA when convenient. 
 When employees are required to do or participate (or not do or participate) 
according to specific verbiage in a contract, this may require a different approach 
to the development of safety culture. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
In order to ensure reliability of data, I digitally recorded all interviews, with the 
permission of the interviewee.  I then ensured that the interviews were fully transcribed 
by a transcription service.  I reviewed the results of the transcription services for accuracy 
as compared to the digitally recorded interview.  There were no changes to the proposed 
process with the execution of the study, with one exception.  In one case, the recordings 
were nearly inaudible.  Therefore, the notes that I had taken electronically were utilized 
for trending in this study. 
Additionally, I intended to continue interviews until data saturation was reached.  
Walden University expects a minimum of 20 interviews will be conducted in for 
phenomenological research.  However, I reached data saturation was before 20 interviews 
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were conducted.  Therefore, the with no new data is being presented, but only a 
continuation of trends in data being observed, data saturation was identified, and I 
stopped the interviews at 15.   
Transferability 
A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study outside of the research 
population.  There will be generalities that apply; however, the study described what was 
determined to be most effective safety interventions implemented by the leaders of the 
organizations represented by the research participants.  In order to determine applicability 
outside of the research participants, the context of the research will be provided, in detail.  
This will allow readers to determine applicability outside of the research population and 
will also assist in ensuring dependability of the study. 
Transferability is enhanced by ensuring data saturation was reached. 
Dependability 
To ensure that the study can be replicated in the future, there is good 
documentation of the semistructured interview questions, of participant selection and 
qualifications. 
Confirmability 
I established trust with the participants in order to ensure the most open and 
honest responses to interview questions.  This trust was first built by explaining the 
interview process.  This includes that consent of the participants will be obtained, 
ensuring that they understand that they may withdraw their participation at any time.  
Additionally, participants were informed that their participation is for research only, all 
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information that could point to a person or an organization will be kept strictly 
confidential and the records will be kept only as long as required by the University; a 
minimum of 5 years following the completion of the dissertation.  All interviews were 
recorded, with the permission of the interviewee.  The interview was then fully 
transcribed.  The interviewee was offered a copy of the transcript, if interested.  This 
ensured that the statements from the participant are not misinterpreted. This additional 
step in the process was to ensure data reliability, but also to gain the trust of the 
participant; so that they understand the research is not attempting to manipulate their 
words, feelings or expressions in order to ensure that the results of the study align with 
the purpose of the study.   
Study Results 
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was 
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their 
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice, 
may allow for improved development of training.  The training could encourage 
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces 
occupational death and injury.  Safety professionals were asked to describe the 
interventions that have been employed by executives in their organization and their 
perception of the effectiveness of such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the 
organization in order to address the central research question of “What are the lived 
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experiences of safety professionals observing the development of safety culture in their 
organization as impacted by the interventions of executives?” 
The result of completing the interviews, transcribing the interviews, hand coding 
and identifying trends resulted in the ability to answer the research question.  Safety 
professionals indicate that executives impact safety culture through their engagement, 
trust, integration and ownership of safety. 
Themes and word or phrase patterns are listed in tables in order to identify the 
repeated and collective terms utilized by participants in their interview responses.  The 
themes of engagement, trust, integration and ownership of safety are present in the tables 
as well as specific quotes from participants.  The table below is formatted in this manner 
in order to allow for a clear interpretation and understanding of the thematic alignment 
based on the exact statements from participants (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Participant Statements Surrounding Development of Safety Culture 




 he always does safety first in his presentation. 
 So, it's always at the front of the mindset of 
everyone that safety comes first. 
 and the partner drove the safety culture at that 
firm and he was a hands on person he got 
involved in discussions with folks that they 
had concerns down to the entry level folks. 
 So, he was fully engaged on a personal level. 
I'm not sure if that's an artifact of the size of 
the company or that. It's based in a kind of a, 
it's based in Seattle, which is a little bit more. 
I don't know if you want to call it. 




 And have the ability to you're talking at that 
executive level, you're talking at that shop for 
level. It's just a unique perspective. But but 
again, pretty much everybody's everyone is 
saying, the same thing can be like, yeah, 
they're out there. They're engaged. They're 
having the conversations. 
 So, from a numbers perspective, the first year, 
we went from a thirty to a ten, second year. 
We went from a ten to a four and the second 
year is when we implemented those, those 
more engagement type programs. 
 He individually went out and made sure that 
he had done an individual audit on every 
single worker there and spoke to every single 
one there… 
 He was modeling the right behavior in more 
than one person out there in the plant 
 With a real focus on working directly with the 
shop floor folks themselves. 
 Safety is emphasized very highly to the 
employees and it is how they start every day. 
 Because at the time their VP or executive 
director attended safety committee meetings, 
 And by, by all means, you know, he, he she 
doesn't have to take all the safety trainings, 
but it's it demonstrate the importance to the 
bench level person. 
 So, he would really be engaged and then the 
word gets out. Oh, [he’s] coming to my lab. 
 so he would engage all levels. 
 And he was very engaged, right? So, I flew 
over there, worked with the team. We did the 
incident evaluation. We looked for corrective 
actions so so he was involved. 
 Can I say engage? Yeah. Yeah, sure. Engage, 
engage. 
 he would engage in a quite with passionate 
way. I'll say he wouldn't be afraid to do it. 
 Therefore, I also think there is a direct 
correlation between leadership being engaged 
in safety in the workplace and holding it as a 
value at the top of the organization and 
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having a good safety culture on the shop 




providing money to 
support safety 
initiative 
 Everybody's going home when it was too hot 
to work… everybody was ..grateful and 
happy about…that they weren't losing any 
pay. 
 I was on site and they did one thing, I would 
say that I thought it was pretty remarkable 
when there was no or mass available they did 
secure masks for people to wear one 
 And for the hours worked and everything, it 
was a ridiculous number. So they 
implemented the safe start program.  I'm not 
sure if you've heard of or not, but it's a 
behavioral safety program 
 it really is remarkable because it's obviously 
costs money to implement a system like that. 
 They also gave us money to get T shirts with 
[our safey] saying on them and our safety 
logo with the [company reference] and they 
always talk about it. 
 we've paid half a million dollars for masks 
and other supplies, 
 So that if people didn't feel safe going home, 
where they felt like, they were gonna take 
something home to their families, they could 
stay in the hotel for few weeks. That's very 
generous. That, that I certainly appreciate. 
 They're putting their money where their 
mouth mouth is, you know, and then it's on 
the other side. It's like, is that they're all about 
numbers just get the job done. 
 Anchored the programs onto an existing run 
rate routine. 
 they'll put their money where their mouth is, 
and they treat their HS person. Like, they're 
the most valuable person on the staff. 
 I got approval to get an expat assignment over 
in China, which was so much costs the 
company, a ton of money. So he approved it. 
He's like, if you say, that's the right person 
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that should go, we're gonna put this person 
over there, right? 
 The executive put money into fixing what the 
team identified as needs, allowed the team 
time to accomplish the actions and tracked 





 They definitely made more trips out to the 
plant, and they were based in Chicago so 
that was a big deal for the hourly 
employees to see, like oh, so, and so's 
coming out to visit us you know, we gotta 
clean up. 
 So one of the things that he did that, I 
thought was was impactful, was that, you 
know, he started a gemba walk routine 
even though the leadership team really 
didn't have a whole lot of concept about 
what gamble was and what it was again. 
 And he also talk to the people on the floor 
while he was, he was going through that 
walk. 
 and talk to people as he walked through 
with no plant manager with him no 
managers with him. No. Engineers with 
them. 
 So we started doing weekly walk about in 
the labs. 
 So but we called we call these leader 
leadership, walk about, right? And so one 
thing we would do is we would focus on 
observable conditions. Right? So you can 
get that from a checklist. 
 We have developed an audit schedule for 
our leadership to walk the shop floors and 
discuss safety with our front-line 
employees and ensure they are visible to 
the workforce 
 Executives care  that's really important to people that are 
working for a living. Right? I mean, you 
know, we can send you home and not tell 
you then your family doesn't need. So 
yeah, so that's big big thing there…. it 
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said a lot to me about his commitment to 
the safety 
 Yeah, so them putting the ownership back 
on them and then saying, you know, we 
do value your safety. What are you going 
to do to work safely every day? 
 And it showed them more that they cared 
by coming out to visit and talking to them 
and actually going out on the floor and 
just instead of just staying up in the office 
area. 
 the temperature checks in the lobby, 
 They do care about our health and safety 
and even though we have to stay open and 
we have to keep running while everyone's 
quarantined at home, 
 he made a point to show that he's 
personally invested in folks safety. 
 and then everyone felt that he cared about 
them. 
 He got to know them by name 
 They really do care and about my safety 
so I'm gonna be on the look out 
 someone who cared who care about 
people care about safety 
 So, when you have someone who is pure 
in their motives, they're doing it because 
they care, because they, they understand 
the risk and they don't want people to get 
hurt and compliance means something to 
them. 
 but they're going to emulate if he cares 
about it or she cares about it. 
 The conversation is more of “let me tell 
you why this is important, because we 
care about you”.   
 
 Lack of engagement 
is obvious when 
safety isn’t a 
priority to 
executives 
 So, even if it's not actual pressure, they 
may perceive that they have to get a job 
done. 
 I mean, I literally got left out of the trailer 
and I got told this whole well, these are 
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men work here and all this kinda kids 
most stuff. And I'm going like. 
 that's what they want is they want stuff to 
get done at any cost. 
 You know, if they think that they're, you 
don't care, there's just a number, and 
you're just trying to get another, you 
know, pill out or another viable vaccine. 
You know, that that's where some of the 
the bad stuff happens. 
 Due to geogrphic proximity to the 
facility… “so he was kind of removed 
from it and the executives didn't really 
have a huge emphasis on safety” 
 Like, we need production is more 
important. We need to get [product] out 
the door. That's what's making us money 
kind of thing. 
 it was more punitive. It was more stick 
and carrot. 
 The leader the leader before was very, 
you know, and it's, it's very cliche, but the 
blame and punish culture. 
 The things kept getting deferred and 
postponed, and then they had an 
employee get hurt. Pretty significantly. 
 Deadlines were over-riding safety 
 And in the the rush to address, and on the 
medical need, I have senior leaders who 
are saying, we're not gonna do that. 
 We'll just drum waste. It's too expensive. 
It's gonna take too long. 
 Safety top priority until, until we're late 
on project deliverables. And then it takes 
a back seat and so we would try to run 
them down every year. 
 So again it's production and timeline to 
some senior leaders out weigh the safety 
component. 
 leadership looked at safety as a roadblock 
to their production quota’s but in turn 




 if you have a work force who continually 
raises risks/safety issues and they are not 
followed up on you will quickly lose buy 
in from the ground floor workers because 
they will view safety as a lost cause being 
that if leadership or management don’t 
view it as a value/priority then why 
should they.   
 
Integration Executive integrated 
safety into business 
operations 
 <<After identifying successes and 
improvements in incidents>> And, and I 
would go to try to make changes or 
tweaks to the program. They'd be like no, 
no, no this is what we want. We want to 
keep doing this this is working for us and 
when we go out to do it, because workers 
don't run away from us. 
 And then if it worked, right, then there's a 
bottom up effect, and you, you start to 
develop culture and you have the basis for 
a good program. 
 safety being part of every conversation 
with leadership and integrating safety into 
the overall business 
Trust Not blaming 
employees (testing 
the system) 
 Heart safety culture in general is, when 
people are over supervised, people don't 
trust their professionalism a stand over 
top of them. 
 I'm so sorry this happened to you we want 
to get you the care. You need, let's make 
sure that you are fine first, and then we'll 
figure out what we can do better down 
down the road. You know, it's it's a 
collaborative effort. 
 We want to improve this process, so this 
doesn't happen someone in the future and 
that resonated with this young person 
strongly. They were very forthcoming. 
They said, Here's some things I can see 
that I did wrong. 
 The question was always, why did you 
have to do the hot work to begin with? 
101 
 
 We were not going to blame that person 
for the event. 
 It was, it was always found to be 
something that could have been or should 
have been improved and the design or the 
maintenance of the equipment, or the type 
of activity. 
 So but we called we call these leader 
leadership, walk about, right? And so one 
thing we would do is we would focus on 
observable conditions. Right? So you can 




 I told him what was happening that if you 
wanted a fake Dowdy heat, exhaustion or 
heat stroke, that, that that was gonna 
happen on these series of days.  And 
basically, what happened was the, he 
called whoever he had a call when they 
base the word down. And next thing I 
know they're come out and they're telling 
everybody okay. 
 So, we're not doing that anymore if we're 
gonna renovate the area and purchase a 
new system, we're gonna purchase it to 
the new standards. We're not gonna do it 
the way we used to because you didn't 
have an answer. So it's just another 
example. 
 He trusted me implicitly, and he would 
back me up the confidence that gave me 
 Because he's supported safety, I was able 
to bring on a health physicist. I was able 
to bring on a bio safety, human subject, 
testing expert. I was able to bring in a 
couple additional engineers. I probably 
tripled the staff. 
Ownership Shop floor 
ownership of safety 
 Like, what are you gonna do to work 
safely every day and make sure that you 
go home safely? So, I thought that was 
kinda of a cool program, and it definitely 
changed the mindset. 
 So that gave the power back to the folks, 
the hourly folks 
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 on the shop floor, they see that it's a 
different message and they're gonna, 
they're not gonna they're not gonna follow 
the safety professionals message. They're 
gonna follow the big person's message. 
 And then if it worked, right, then there's a 
bottom up effect, and you, you start to 
develop culture and you have the basis for 
a good program 
 And when you have people who are 
wearing them, and people who aren't 
wearing them, and you say, well, why 
aren't you wear your safety glasses? And 
they say, well, nobody cares, you know, 
it's a gauge. It's a gauge where you're at. 
 
There were outliers reported by participants that were not aligned with the common 
words, phrases and themes highlighted by the other participants.  These outliers 
originated from a participant who worked for a federal employer.  Federal employers are 
not required to comply with federal workplace regulations, such as OSHA.  Therefore, 
there is a significant difference between a federal employer choosing not to follow an 
OSHA regulation and a private industry employer willfully outside of OSHA compliance.  
The implications to the safety culture would be significantly different.  For that reason, 
statements surrounding a choice not to follow regulations was omitted from the results of 
the study.  For this reason, further investigation into the culture of Federal employers and 
the development of culture would be interesting.  The following quotes support these 
statements:   
 They, they can choose to follow OSHA when convenient. 
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 When employees are required to do or participate (or not do or participate) 
according to specific verbiage in a contract, this may require a different approach 
to the development of safety culture. 
Summary 
Safety professionals were asked to describe the interventions that have been 
employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of 
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization in order to address 
the central research question of “What are the lived experiences of safety professionals 
observing the development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the 
interventions of executives?”  The intent of this research question was to describe the 
effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their organizations, 
as perceived by safety professionals.  The result of completing the interviews, 
transcribing the interviews, hand coding and identifying trends resulted in the ability to 
answer the research question.  Safety professionals indicate that executives impact safety 
culture through their engagement, trust, integration and ownership of safety. 
Chapter 5 will review then interpret the findings, discuss limitations of the study, 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological study was to 
describe executive effectiveness in influencing the safety culture within their 
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  To understand the perception of 
cultural interventions at executive levels of organizations, I interviewed safety 
professionals at various organizations.  The safety professional has unique access to 
executive level employees, shop floor employees, and all management levels in between 
and has training, experience, and education to understand safety culture and implications.  
Based on experiences, safety professionals are uniquely positioned to describe their 
perceptions of effectiveness of leader interventions on the safety culture of the 
organization.   
I included open-ended questions in the interviews, designed to elicit the safety 
professional’s perception of the effectiveness of interventions employed by executive 
levels of management on improving the safety culture.  The data were then analyzed by 
creating a written transcript, conducting coding to identify themes in the responses of 
participants.  Safety professionals indicated that executives impacted safety culture 
through their engagement, trust, integration and ownership of safety. 
Interpretation of Findings 
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of 
occupational injury.  A contributing cause in nearly 88% occupational incidents is unsafe 
behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and beliefs toward safety due to a 
lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive safety culture (Zhang et al., 
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2018).  However, executives use dynamic or on the fly leadership methods (Gravina et 
al., 2017) which raises concerns about leaders’ interventions on safety culture and the 
implications of those interventions on safety behaviors and work-related accidents 
(Engemann & Scott, 2018).  Therefore, Bronkhorst et al. (2018) identified the need for a 
study of interventions employed by management to improve safety culture.  Additionally, 
the studies below proposed future research be conducted in the area of safety leadership: 
 The results of Mullen, Kelloway, and Teed (2017), a study utilizing social 
exchange theory framework, indicate that future research is needed to assess the 
impact of the interventions that can improve safety leadership and encourage 
employee safety behaviors to prevent incidents.   
 Pilbeam et al. (2016) found that the relationship between the front-line supervisor 
and their direct reports have been studied, while other leadership relationships 
(such as senior managers) that set the tone for safety culture within their 
organizations are in need of investigation.  
 Fruhen et al. (2014) suggested that senior leaders had significant influence on 
safety culture but did not explain which characteristics of the senior leader had the 
greatest effect.   
 A limitation of the Michael et al. (2006) study was associated with not collecting 
information from the perspective of the safety professional, but rather senior 




The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe 
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within 
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive interventions; the words and actions or voice, of executives 
may allow for the development of training.  The training could encourage executives to 
practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death 
and injury.  I conducted this research with the intent of filling gaps in previous research 
or recommendations for future research from several recent studies. 
In order to address the needs identified in previous studies, the framework for this 
study drew upon the theory of planned behavior and social exchange theory.  Ajzen’s 
(1991) theory of planned behavior suggests that employee behavior is based on the norms 
accepted by significant individuals in the organization.  Montano and Kasprzyk (2015) 
proposed the use of the theory of planned behavior in conjunction with the theory of 
planned action in order to consider accepted norms as well as attitudes, behaviors and 
feelings of control.  These theories are applicable to safety culture as employee safety 
attitude and behavior have been found to be influenced by an organization's safety 
culture, which is based on the organization's beliefs and attitude toward safety (Choudhry 
et al., 2007). 
Social exchange theory indicates that if employees perceive that the company is 
concerned with their well being, employees will work to benefit the company (Blau, 
1964).  When applying social exchange theory to occupational safety, the theory suggests 
that if safety is seen as a concern, employees will comply with safety requirements, with 
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exchanges influencing safety culture as described by Reader, Mearns, Lopes and Kuha 
(2017).  This is echoed by Zacharatos et al. (2005) who found that if safety is perceived 
as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind.  
The perception of management commitment to safety predicts behavior (Zohar & 
Polachek, 2014).   
I conducted this research in order to focus on the perception of the effectiveness 
of executive interventions on the safety culture of the organization.  This study addressed 
a limitation of the Michael et al. (2006) study, by collecting information from the 
perspective of the safety professional; not senior leaders, the supervisor or shop floor 
employees measuring themselves.   This study focused on the attitude and commitment of 
the senior leader through their interactions with their organization’s safety professional.  
This research was conducted is in alignment with Fruhen et al. (2014) who suggested 
researching the views of other employees in the organizational hierarchy.  The research 
intended to fill an additional gap by identifying which characteristics, at the senior 
manager organizational levels, have been identified as having the greatest impact on 
safety culture and safety performance, as identified by Fruhen et al. (2014).   
Finally, this study is intended to begin to fill the gap identified by Bronkhorst et 
al. (2018), Mullen, Kelloway, and Teed (2017), Pilbeam et al. (2016), Fruhen et al. (2014 
and Michael et al. (2006),  by identifying the observed interventions of leaders and the 
impact of those interventions, as observed by the safety professional supporting the 
organization.   
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I identified that executives impact safety culture through their engagement, trust, 
integration and ownership of safety.  More specifically, executives can influence safety 
culture by the following means: 
 Executives engaging with employees 
 Executives providing money to support safety initiative 
 Executives conducting physical site walkthroughs 
 Executives demonstrating care  
 Obvious lack of engagement when safety isn’t a priority to executives 
 Executive integrated safety into business operations 
 Not blaming employees 
 Trusting recommendations of safety professional 
 Shop floor ownership of safety 
Limitations of the Study 
In the initial development of this study, I identified a limitation associated with 
the transferability of the study outside of the research population.  This limitation still 
holds true, after the completion of the study.  While there are certainly generalities that 
apply, the study will show what was determined to be the most effective safety 
interventions implemented by the leaders of the organizations represented by the research 
participants.  In order to determine applicability outside of the research participants, I 
have provided the context of the research, in detail.  This will allow readers to determine 
applicability outside of the research population and will also assist in ensuring 
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dependability of the study.  No additional limitations to trustworthiness are expected to 
have arisen from the execution of the study. 
Recommendations 
In alignment with the recommendations of Sheehan et al. (2016), the data 
collected for this study was collected from across the United States, representing many 
different types of organizations (private and public, high and low hazard) in different 
sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.) and across multiple 
organizations and those which do not represent only blue collar jobs.  Additionally, the 
data was collected in the form of interviews from across the United States, representing 
many different types of organizations (private and public, high and low hazard) in 
different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.), to fill a research gap 
indicated by Fruhen et al.(2013).   
However, the data associated with my research is not correlated with type or 
sector of the job in question.  Therefore, I propose that future research completely address 
the recommendation of Sheehan et. al (2016) and Fruhen et. al (2013), as it relates to 
correlating the interactions of executive leaders (as observed by safety professionals) 
with the type of industry or sector of industry.  The results of this type of survey could 
result in more direct guidance to executives, based on their industry. 
Finally, future research should try to address the limitations associated with 
transferability of this study.  A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study 
outside of the research population.  There will be generalities that apply; however, the 
study will show what was determined to be most effective safety interventions 
110 
 
implemented by the leaders of the organizations represented by the research participants.  
Therefore, I suggest that future research be conducted with a quantitative approach via a 
method that can be distributed widely to a significant number of safety professionals.  
Future researchers should utilize the trends identified in this survey as the basis for the 
quantitative survey.  Safety professionals should then identify their industry, size, 
geographic location, level of “executive leadership” at the site and which types of 
interventions are employed by executive leaders in order to impact safety culture.  
Conducting future studies in this manner would allow for broader transferability as well 
as the ability to see additional trends based on geography or industry.   
Implications  
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of 
occupational injury.  Approximately 88% of occupational injuries are associated with 
unsafe behaviors which are a result of the safety culture that has developed within the 
organization through the interactions, messages, and expectations of the organization. 
The most consistent demonstration of safety culture and management role in 
development of safety culture comes from the relationship with their direct manager 
(Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989).  However, organizations struggle with ensuring that the 
safety culture of the executive leadership team is conveyed to shop-floor employees 
(Antonsen, 2009).  This is vital, as senior managers set the tone for safety culture within 
their organizations (Pilbeam et al., 2016).  Therefore, research was conducted into the 
interventions employed by executives to improve safety culture, as recommended by 
Bronkhorst, Tummers, and Steijn (2018).   
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My research found interventions observed by safety professionals within the 
organization that have been employed by executives in order to build a positive safety 
culture for their organization.  In many cases, these interactions were, in the perception of 
the safety professionals, able to reduce unsafe behaviors and reduce occupational injury.  
Reductions in occupational injury and death would result in improvements for employees 
and the general economy as positive safety culture has been found to reduce death and 
injury within an organization (Neal & Griffin, 2006) and influences positive social 
change through reductions in the loss of life and loss of financial resources (Marucci-
Wellman et al., 2015). 
The social change that this research can drive is an improvement in safety culture, 
leading to improved safety behaviors and a reduction in occupational deaths and injuries.  
This improvement can be brought about by developing education for executive leaders 
with regards to interventions and the impact on safety culture.  This education would 
incorporate the interventions identified by participating safety professionals based on the 
interventions they found most effective at fostering a positive safety culture.  An example 
of information that could be communicated to executive, including focus areas, types of 
interventions and specific actions is included in Figure 3, based on the feedback of 
interview participants. 
 




 Start every meeting with a safety message. 
 Engage with employees on a personal level. 




 Attend safety committee meetings, participate 
in trainings. 
 Participate in incident investigations. 
 Executives 
providing money to 
support safety 
initiative 
 Ensure availability of proper tools to do the 
job. 
 Invest in internal or external hazard 
recognition techniques (example: behavior-
based-safety programs, communication tools, 
etc.). 
 Hire (and retain) the right resources. 
 Allow teams the resources to fix identified 





 Conduct routine physical site walk-throughs 
of the site/production area/lab.  Engage the 
shop-floor.  Take only a small group. 
 Be visible. 
 Don’t hesitate to talk safety. 
 Executives care  Communicate that employee safety is valued. 
 Demonstrate, via actions, that employee 
safety is valued. 
 Engage personally with employees (show true 
care/concern for employee safety, learn 
names, etc.). 
 Lack of engagement 
is obvious when 
safety isn’t a 
priority to 
executives 
 Identify and eliminate even the perception 
that job completion or cost is valued over 
safety.   
 Be cautious with a punitive approach to 
safety.   
 Be aware of deferments. 
 Ensure your actions match your words. 
 Address issues timely to ensure 
employees report and continue to report 
their concerns. 
Integration Executive integrated 
safety into business 
operations 
 Integrate safety requirements into 
production schedules 
 Support top-down and bottom-up safety 
culture development 
 Embed safety in every conversation 
Trust Not blaming 
employees (testing 
the system) 
 Following an event, ensure all personnel 
are ok and understand investigations are 
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focused on preventing future events 
(rather than finding fault). 
 Investigate events to true root cause, for 
example, why was an employee even 
asked to perform that hazardous task? 





 Support the purpose of design standards 
despite cost and productivity impacts. 
 Stand-by and support your safety 
professional. 
 Fund safety. 
Ownership Shop floor 
ownership of safety 
 Establish limits for shop-floor personnel 
power over addressing safety concerns. 
 Ensure consistency on your safety 
message. 
 Hold employees accountable for safety 
performance. 
 
Figure 3.  Actions to support safety culture development 
 
Education presented to executives on this topic can help to develop a positive 
safety culture in an organization, resulting in fewer occupational injuries or deaths, thus 
positively impacting society. 
Conclusions 
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of 
occupational injury.  Approximately 88% of occupational injuries are associated with 
unsafe behaviors which are a result of the safety culture that has developed within the 
organization through the interactions, messages and expectations of the organization.  It 
has long been identified that management plays a role in the development of safety 
culture, yet studies such as Bronkhorst et al. (2018), Mullen, Kelloway, & Teed (2017), 
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Pilbeam et al. (2016),  Fruhen et al. (2014 and Michael et al. (2006),  identified a gap in 
identifying exactly which interventions assisted in the development of a positive safety 
culture.  The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was 
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their 
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals.  A greater understanding of how 
safety professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice, 
may allow for improved development of training.  The training could encourage 
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces 
occupational death and injury; a significant loss to a family, a workplace and a 
community.   
The results of this study indicate that more specifically, executives can influence 
safety culture by the following means: 
 Executives engaging with employees 
 Executives providing money to support safety initiative 
 Executives conducting physical site walkthroughs 
 Executives demonstrating care  
 Obvious lack of engagement when safety isn’t a priority to executives 
 Executive integrated safety into business operations 
 Not blaming employees 
 Trusting recommendations of safety professional 
 Shop floor ownership of safety 
115 
 
Through the development of education for executives on the interventions that 
they could employ to improve safety culture and reduce injuries and fatalities, a 
percentage of the nearly 5,000 employees lost each year to occupational injuries can be 
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Appendix A: Participant Invite 
 
Dear Safety Professional; 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study associated with the lived experience of 
safety professionals observing the development of safety culture in their organization, as 
impacted by the interventions of executives.  The purpose of this study is to describe the 
effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on organizational safety culture, 
as perceived by safety professionals 
 
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Tami Walters, who is a doctoral 
student at Walden University. 
 
The researcher is inviting practicing safety professionals who have obtained a 4-year 
degree, have worked in their organization for more than 2 years and who have at least 5 
years of experience as a safety professional to participate in the study.  The inclusion 
criteria was established to ensure that only experienced safety professionals, who 
understand and can identify the attributes of safety culture, participate in the study. 
 
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. No one will 
treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you decide to be in the study 
now, you can still change your mind later. You may stop at any time.  If you agree to be 
in this study, you will be asked to:  
 Review and acknowledge your rights under the informed consent process. 
 Participate in an ~60 minute, Skype (or other non-contact interview style) 
meeting to answer questions about how executives with whom you interact 
impact the safety culture of the organization which you support.  As a thank you 
for your time, understanding the stress of your daily life, I’d like to treat you to a 
cup of coffee (via an electronic gift card), as we conduct our interview.  This 
will ensure that you start or end your day on a positive note and will show my 
gratitude for your participation. 
 Participate in follow up questions via phone or email (if necessary). 
 
No personal or personally identifiable information will be collected about yourself, your 
employer or other employees of your employer.  The questions that will be asked during 
the interview include the following:  
o How would you describe your interactions with executives and the 
interactions of shop floor employees as it relates to the safety culture? 
o How would you describe the safety culture of the shop floor employees? 
o Do executive decisions regarding operational issues (such as changes to 
the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the appropriate 
focus on safety?  If so, please give examples. Do executive decisions 
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regarding operational issues (such as changes to the scope of work or 
response to operational events) reflect the appropriate focus on safety?  If 
so, please give examples. 
o Provide examples of situations in which there was a perception of 
executive trade off/conflict between safety and production (e.g., there was 
pressure to meet a schedule goal, but you or someone you know identified 
a problem which would delay the work)?  Have you ever run into a 
situation like this?  If so, what did you do?  How did it work out?   
o How would you describe the safety culture of the executives on the 
jobsite? 
o How would you describe the leadership style of executives? 
o What actions have been taken by executives to influence the safety culture 
at the jobsite and what where the effects of those actions? 
 
The benefit of participating in this study is that the outcome of the study could benefit the 
safety community as a whole in the form of a greater understanding of how safety 
professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice of 
executives.  This may allow for the development of training and educational materials to 
encourage executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that 
reduces occupational death and injury! 
 
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may 
contact the researcher.  
 








Appendix B:  Interview Protocol 
 
Participants:  The researcher is inviting practicing safety professionals who have 
obtained a 4-year degree, have worked in their organization for more than 2 years and 
who have at least 5 years of experience as a safety professional to participate in the study.  
The inclusion criteria was established to ensure that only experienced safety 
professionals, who understand and can identify the attributes of safety culture, participate 
in the study. 
 
Method of Interview:  An ~60 minute, Skype (or other non-contact interview style) 
meeting to answer questions about how executives interact to impact the safety culture of 
the organization in which the safety professional supports.  If follow-up is required, it 
may be complete by phone, email or a continued interview. 
 
Structure of Interview:  The interviews will be semi-structured around 7 key questions.  
Depending upon participant responses to the question, additional, clarifying questions 
may be asked.  Similarly, if a participant addresses more than one question in a response, 
that question will not be asked again. 
 
Primary Interview Questions:   
o How would you describe your interactions with executives and the 
interactions of shop floor employees as it relates to the safety culture? 
o How would you describe the safety culture of the shop floor employees? 
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o Do executive decisions regarding operational issues (such as changes to 
the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the appropriate 
focus on safety?  If so, please give examples. Do executive decisions 
regarding operational issues (such as changes to the scope of work or 
response to operational events) reflect the appropriate focus on safety?  If 
so, please give examples. 
o Provide examples of situations in which there was a perception of 
executive trade off/conflict between safety and production (e.g., there was 
pressure to meet a schedule goal, but you or someone you know identified 
a problem which would delay the work)?  Have you ever run into a 
situation like this?  If so, what did you do?  How did it work out?   
o How would you describe the safety culture of the executives on the 
jobsite? 
o How would you describe the leadership style of executives? 
o What actions have been taken by executives to influence the safety culture 
at the jobsite and what where the effects of those actions? 
 
